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SCRUTINY-DETERMINATION AVOIDANCE
IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES:
LAUDABLE MINIMALISM OR
CONDEMNABLE EVASION?
Clay Calvert
This Article examines the United States Supreme Court’s practice in First
Amendment cases of not resolving the precise level of scrutiny that applies to
measure a statute’s validity. Rather than opting for one of two tiers of scrutiny—
one more rigorous than the other—the Court sometimes dodges the issue. It does
this by concluding that a statute would not pass muster under the more lenient
standard, thereby rendering it unnecessary to decide which test was, in fact, more
appropriate. The Court thus adopts an “assuming-without-deciding” logic in
such cases, simply supposing the lesser standard applies without definitively
holding as much. In turn, when lower courts confront uncertainty regarding the
correct level of scrutiny, they too sometimes avoid picking one standard of review
by embracing this “it wouldn’t make any difference anyway” brand of reasoning.
This Article addresses why the Supreme Court engages in this practice. Additionally, it considers how this variety of procedural minimalism, which it dubs scrutiny-determination avoidance, affects doctrinal development of the pivotal division
between content-based and content-neutral laws. First Amendment scrutiny selection hinges largely on that distinction. Furthermore, this Article analyzes what
the implementation of this minimalistic tack may indicate about the practical differences between the strict and intermediate scrutiny standards in their realworld application.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Billups v. City of Charleston considered a First Amendment free-speech challenge to an ordinance that required individuals seeking to lead paid tours of
Charleston, South Carolina, to first obtain a license by passing a written examination regarding the metropolis and its history.1 The Fourth Circuit initially
concluded that the ordinance burdened not simply conduct, but speech safeguarded by that constitutional provision.2 It succinctly reasoned that “the business of leading tours depends on the expression of ideas.”3

1

Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673, 676–78 (4th Cir. 2020). The First Amendment
to the US Constitution provides, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated ninety-six years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties applicable for governing the
actions of state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights
and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
2 Billups, 961 F.3d at 683 (“The Ordinance undoubtedly burdens protected speech, as it prohibits unlicensed tour guides from leading paid tours—in other words, speaking to visitors—
on certain public sidewalks and streets.”). Charleston unsuccessfully argued that the regulation did not raise any First Amendment concerns because it targeted only the economic con-
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The Fourth Circuit then turned to another issue—namely, identifying the
level of scrutiny the law needed to clear to be constitutional.4 This step is routine, as selecting scrutiny standards is a well-established facet of First Amendment analysis.5 It usually involves determining if a law is content-based or content-neutral.6 This is part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s content-neutrality
doctrine,7 under which content-based discrimination is considered especially
abhorrent.8 Content-based statutes either single out particular topics, ideas, or
subjects for regulation—while leaving others unfettered—or are enacted because of governmental disagreement with a particular message.9 In contrast,
content-neutral measures regulate “speech unrelated to its content”10 and
“without regard to what is said.”11 Content-neutral laws thus typically govern
only the time, place, or manner of speech, not its substance.12

duct of leading paid tours and affected speech merely incidentally to that conduct. Id. at
682–83.
3 Id. at 684.
4 Id.
5 See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52
IND. L. REV. 355, 355 (2019) (“The preliminary decision that must be made in First
Amendment free speech cases is what level of review to apply.”).
6 See Susan L. Trevarthen & Adam M. Hapner, The True Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert
on Sign Regulation, 49 STETSON L. REV. 509, 511 (2020) (“[T]o assess whether a regulation
of speech violates the First Amendment, the analysis should always begin by determining
whether the regulation is ‘content-based’ or ‘content-neutral.’ ”).
7 See Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for ContentNeutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1265–66 (2014) (observing that “[t]he Roberts Court
has adverted to content neutrality as a defining element of First Amendment doctrine” in
numerous cases).
8 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“But, above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
9 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 155–56, 163–64 (2015) (noting that contentbased regulations “target speech based on its communicative content,” including “draw[ing]
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys” and applying “to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” and adding that laws can be
content-based even when they are facially neutral if they were adopted due to disagreement
with the message being conveyed); see also Kent Greenfield, Trademarks, Hate Speech, and
Solving a Puzzle of Viewpoint Bias, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 184 (“[C]ontent-based laws
make regulatory choices on the basis of the topic or subject matter of the speech in question[.]”).
10 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014).
11
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996); see Howard M. Wasserman,
Bartnicki as Lochner: Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV.
421, 434 (2006) (“Content-neutral laws apply to all speech, regardless of subject matter,
speaker, or point of view, and are justified or explained without regard to the substance of
the speech regulated.”).
12 See Clay Calvert & Minch Minchin, Can the Undue-Burden Standard Add Clarity and
Rigor to Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence? A Proposal Cutting
Across Constitutional Domains for Time, Place & Manner Regulations, 69 OKLA. L. REV.
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Drawing this distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws is
pivotal. That is because content-based laws generally are subject to the rigorous
strict scrutiny standard of review, while content-neutral measures face the more
lenient and deferential intermediate scrutiny test.13 To pass strict scrutiny, the
government must prove two things—that it possesses a compelling interest in
regulating speech and that the law at issue is narrowly tailored such that it restricts no more speech than is necessary to serve that compelling interest.14 In
contrast, intermediate scrutiny usually requires the government to demonstrate
that a content-neutral law serves a significant interest and is narrowly tailored,
although the law need not use the least restrictive means of aiding that interest.15 Scrutiny selection thus is crucial: while statutes rarely surmount strict
scrutiny, they are much more likely to survive intermediate review.16 Put differently, strict scrutiny normally sounds the death knell for legislative handi-

623, 626 (2017) (noting that the intermediate scrutiny test is “generally applicable to content-neutral regulations affecting the time, place, and manner . . . of speech”).
13 Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2346 (2020). As Professor Genevieve Lakier encapsulates it:
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech is one of the
most important in First Amendment law. For decades now, the Supreme Court has insisted that
content-based laws—laws that restrict speech because of its ideas or messages or subject matter—are presumptively unconstitutional, and will be sustained only if they can satisfy strict scrutiny. In contrast, content-neutral laws—laws that regulate speech for some reason other than its
content—are reviewed under a lesser, and often quite deferential, standard.

Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory
First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233 (2017); see also Judith Welch Wegner &
Matthew Norchi, Regulating Panhandling: Reed and Beyond, 63 S.D. L. REV. 579, 593
(2019) (describing strict scrutiny as “the most stringent constitutional test” and intermediate
scrutiny as “a less exacting test”).
14 Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); United States v. Playboy Ent.
Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
15 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 486. The word “usually” is important in this sentence in articulating the intermediate scrutiny test because “the precise formulation of the standard has varied
based on the context.” David S. Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CALIF. L. REV. 65, 114
(2017). For example, sometimes other terms are used in place of “significant” when describing the requisite level of governmental interest. See Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman, The Future of Physicians’ First Amendment Freedom: Professional Speech in an Era
of Radically Expanded Prenatal Genetic Testing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 577, 611 (2019)
(noting that under intermediate scrutiny, the question is whether a regulation serves “a ‘significant/substantial/important’ government interest” (quoting Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test
That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 783, 801 (2007))).
16 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (“This is . . . one of the rare
cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”); see also Bhagwat, supra
note 15, at 809 (concluding, based on an examination of cases that applied the intermediate
scrutiny test in First Amendment disputes, that the government won 73 percent of the time).
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work,17 while the Supreme Court’s implementation of intermediate scrutiny
typically is “extremely light and deferential.”18
The Fourth Circuit in Billups, however, declined to resolve whether
Charleston’s ordinance requiring individuals to pass a written examination to
obtain a license before leading paid tours of the city was content-based or content-neutral.19 Rather than grappling with the content-neutrality question, the
appellate court skipped it. It simply found that the law could not survive the
less-stringent intermediate scrutiny test, thus rendering it unnecessary to discern if the law actually was content-based and thus should have been required
to pass the higher strict scrutiny standard.20 In brief, the Fourth Circuit (1)
merely assumed the ordinance was content-neutral,21 (2) applied intermediate
scrutiny, and (3) concluded that it failed that test because it was not narrowly
tailored to serve Charleston’s significant interest in preventing tours led by unknowledgeable and fraudulent guides.22
The Fourth Circuit was not the sole federal appellate court in 2020 to
dodge the issue of whether a law was content-based or content-neutral and, in
so doing, to pass on identifying the more appropriate—strict or intermediate—
scrutiny standard. To wit, the Eleventh Circuit in Harbourside Place, LLC v.
Town of Jupiter addressed the constitutionality of a local noise ordinance that
required businesses hosting live, outside musical performances either to comply
with restrictions on sound amplification during particular hours of the day or to
obtain a special permit from the municipality.23 The Eleventh Circuit rather
ruefully observed that characterizing this measure as either content-based or
content-neutral was “a very tricky matter.”24 For example, the court noted that
the sound ordinance applied only to one medium of expression—live musical
performances—and did not affect other types of live expression, such as political speeches and poetry readings.25 This seemingly suggested the ordinance
was content-based because one variety of content—music—was regulated
17

Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting
the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1351 (2006).
18 Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 223.
19 Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673, 684–85 (4th Cir. 2020).
20 See id. at 685 (“Here . . . the Ordinance cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny. Because we therefore can resolve this appeal without deciding the content-neutrality question,
we decline to rule thereon.”).
21 See id. (“Because we assume that the Ordinance is content-neutral, we proceed to consider the remaining requirements. The City bears the burden of proving that the Ordinance survives intermediate scrutiny.”).
22 Id. at 686, 690.
23 Harbourside Place, LLC. v. Town of Jupiter, 958 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2020) (“That
leaves § 13-107(a)(3), which provides (emphasis ours) that ‘[o]utside live musical performances associated with a non-residential establishment shall meet the outdoor venue regulations . . . or obtain special permits[.]’ ”).
24 Id. at 1318.
25 Id.
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while other types were not.26 Yet the measure applied evenhandedly to all genres of music, be it rap, classical, country, or something else,27 thereby indicating it was content-neutral. Also militating on the side of being content-neutral,
according to the Eleventh Circuit, was the fact that the ordinance only regulated
live music, not recorded music, thus suggesting it only affected the manner in
which music was transmitted.28
Given this complexity and what it called “the lack of a fully developed
record,” the Eleventh Circuit deemed it “a good opportunity . . . to practice judicial minimalism” and to conclude only that the trial court had not abused its
discretion when it denied a preliminary injunction that would have stopped the
ordinance’s enforcement.29 In embracing this tack, the appellate court failed to
answer the query of whether the ordinance was content-based or contentneutral.30
Scrutiny-determination avoidance also transpired in August 2020. That is
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered a First
Amendment challenge to a local ordinance banning standing, sitting, or remaining for most purposes on the medians in public roadways.31 The appellate court
in McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City found it unnecessary to resolve whether
the statute was a content-based law requiring strict scrutiny analysis because
the court assumed it was content-neutral and then concluded it could not pass
the more relaxed intermediate scrutiny test––a conclusion the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2021 declined to review.32
Should the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits be chided or otherwise rebuked for engaging in scrutiny-determination avoidance? Most likely not. That
is because, as this Article will explain, they were merely following the U.S.

26

See supra note 9 and accompanying text (providing a general description of content-based
laws).
27 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1318.
28 Id. at 1319–20 (“A non-residential establishment in Jupiter can play recorded music of
any kind (assuming compliance with other provisions of the Code, such as those dealing
with outdoor sound amplification), so music is not targeted generally or specifically. Viewed
this way, [the statute] looks more like a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation.”).
29 Id. at 1322.
30 See id. (“We therefore do not definitively decide whether § 13-107(a)(3) is on its face a
content-based or content-neutral regulation of speech.”).
31 McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City, 973 F.3d 1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 2020).
32 Id. at 1070. As the Tenth Circuit explained:
Plaintiffs argue that we should apply strict scrutiny because the Revised Ordinance discriminates
based on content. We need not reach this argument. As discussed below, we ultimately conclude
the Revised Ordinance fails even intermediate scrutiny. Because it would necessarily also fail
strict scrutiny, we assume for the purposes of our analysis that the Revised Ordinance is contentneutral.

Id. The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in March 2021. City of
Oklahoma City v. McCraw, 141 S. Ct. 1738 (2021).
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Supreme Court’s lead in several First Amendment cases embracing this minimalistic methodology.
More specifically, this Article will examine the practice of scrutinydetermination avoidance, why it is used, and what it may indicate not only
about the sometimes-hazy distinction between content-based and contentneutral laws, but also about the meaningful differences—if any—between the
strict and intermediate scrutiny tests in their real-world application, particularly
when it comes to their narrow-tailoring prongs. Part I will explore the Supreme
Court’s practice of scrutiny-determination avoidance.33 In particular, it will (1)
address the concept of judicial minimalism; (2) discuss reasons why it may or
may not be advantageous to embrace scrutiny-determination avoidance; and (3)
analyze, in the process, several recent cases in which the Court either has
adopted scrutiny-determination avoidance or has been rebuked by one of its
members for failing to do so. Part II will then return to the trio of 2020 federal
appellate court rulings described above to explore the troubles they likely reveal with the content-neutrality doctrine and how those problems, in turn,
plague scrutiny selection.34 Finally, this Article will conclude by contending
that scrutiny-determination avoidance is just as much a sign of doctrinal disorder in First Amendment jurisprudence as it is an effective tool of judicial minimalism.35
I.

DODGING SCRUTINY DETERMINATIONS: THE NATION’S HIGH COURT
PAVES THE PATH

This Part explores multiple reasons why the Supreme Court might engage
in scrutiny-determination avoidance in First Amendment free speech cases, as
well as controversies that arose when the Court has and has not done so. Section A examines the choice to dodge scrutiny selection as a facet of judicial
minimalism, with its use possibly uniting more Justices around a single opinion
than without it. Next, Section B addresses scrutiny-determination avoidance in
terms of promoting the interests of judicial economy and efficiency. Section C
then analyzes scrutiny-determination avoidance as a means of creating precedent that strict scrutiny does not necessarily apply in all future cases involving
the same form or medium of expression, especially when the application of
strict scrutiny might jeopardize the constitutionality of seemingly innocuous
and benign legislation. Section D turns to the use of scrutiny-determination
avoidance in First Amendment cases where the underlying issue is both politically and socially divisive, such as abortion, as well as its deployment as a
mechanism to avoid overruling precedent and violating the principle of stare
decisis. Finally, Section E considers the use of scrutiny-determination avoid-

33
34
35

Infra Part I.
Infra Part II.
Infra Conclusion.
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ance when the Court is faced with adopting a standard of review in an emerging, inchoate doctrinal area.
A. Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance as an Exercise in Judicial Minimalism
and a Mechanism to Unite the Justices Around a Single Opinion
Chief Justice John Roberts avers that “[i]f it is not necessary to decide
more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide more.”36 Indeed, as Professor Jonathan Adler recently wrote, Chief Justice Roberts “prefers narrow rulings over sweeping judgments.”37 He has done this in multiple
cases over the years, affecting the development of various First Amendment
doctrines.38
Chief Justice Roberts thus might be considered a minimalist, at least when
it comes to implementing mechanisms that allow a case to be resolved without
reaching larger issues. As Cass Sunstein crisply encapsulates it, “A minimalist
court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things undecided.”39 He adds
that, procedurally speaking, “minimalism is designed to leave things open, to
decide cases as narrowly as possible.”40
Under this minimalistic philosophy, it is completely sensible not to resolve
the sometimes-thorny question—one over which the Justices may disagree—
regarding the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should apply to measure a
statute’s validity if, in fact, the statute would fail to survive whatever standard
was deployed. Minimalism, as Professor Robert Anderson IV writes, thus “allows Justices to reach some common ground even when they disagree about a
great deal.”41 In other words, the Justices might all agree that a statute violates
the First Amendment—the common ground—but differ regarding which standard of scrutiny is more appropriate to evaluate it.

36

See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362 (2006) (quoting
Chief Justice Roberts’s remarks during a 2006 commencement address at the Georgetown
University Law Center). Another source quotes Justice Roberts slightly differently for this
proposition during the same address. See Associated Press, Chief Justice Says His Goal Is
More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/
22/washington/22justice.html [perma.cc/23DJ-49G4] (“If it is not necessary to decide more
to a case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide more to a case.”).
37 Jonathan H. Adler, Conservative Minimalism and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 28 (2020).
38 See Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying
the Price in First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism &
Partisanship, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 944–47 (2016) (reviewing multiple First
Amendment cases in which the Roberts Court has practiced some combination of minimalism and avoidance).
39 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
ix (2001).
40 Id. at 61.
41 Robert Anderson IV, Measuring Meta-Doctrine: An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Minimalism in the Supreme Court, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1045, 1076 (2009).
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A hypothetical illustrates how such a situation might arise. Specifically,
Justice Stephen Breyer repeatedly expresses the view that strict scrutiny should
not apply simply because a law is content-based.42 As Justice Breyer explained
in 2015, “the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many
contexts . . . as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’
trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.”43 Justice Breyer advocates for a more flexible proportionality approach to scrutiny that “appeal[s]
more often and more directly to the values the First Amendment seeks to protect”44 and examines whether a “statute works speech-related harm that is out
of proportion to its justifications.”45 In brief, Justice Breyer calls “for an alternative to strict scrutiny triggered by facially content-based regulations.”46
Now envision a scenario involving a seemingly content-based law that, under the Court’s traditional approach described above, would face strict scrutiny
and be declared unconstitutional.47 If the law would also fail intermediate scrutiny, however, then the Court might simply assume, for the sake of argument,
that it was content-neutral and apply intermediate scrutiny in order to bring Justice Breyer on board for a more unified opinion. Justice Breyer, on at least two
occasions, has equated intermediate scrutiny with his proportionality methodology, thus suggesting such an “assuming arguendo” approach to scrutiny
might succeed in some instances with him.48 Not only would using strict scrutiny be unnecessary in these situations, but not applying it also might ward off
Justice Breyer penning, as he is prone to do, a separate opinion that both attacks
the application of strict scrutiny simply because a law is content-based and extolls the virtues of his preferred proportionality tack.49
42

See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2360 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgment, dissenting in part) (“[T]he First Amendment does not support the
mechanical conclusion that content discrimination automatically triggers strict scrutiny . . . .”).
43 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).
44 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
45 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
46 Carmen Maye, Public-College Student-Athletes and Game-Time Anthem Protests: Is
There a Need for a Constitutional-Analytical Audible?, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 55, 89–90
(2019).
47 Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2346 (noting that content-based laws generally must face strict scrutiny).
48 See id. at 2362 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part) (“That inquiry ultimately evaluates a restriction’s speech-related harms in light of its justifications. We have
typically called this approach ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ though we have sometimes referred to
it as an assessment of ‘fit,’ sometimes called it ‘proportionality,’ and sometimes just applied
it without using a label.”); Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Sometimes the
Court has referred to this approach as ‘intermediate scrutiny,’ sometimes as ‘proportionality’
review, sometimes as an examination of ‘fit,’ and sometimes it has avoided the application
of any label at all.”).
49 See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 175–76 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s ex-
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B. Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance in the Name of Judicial Economy
Beyond exercising minimalism—either in the name of exercising a distinct
judicial philosophy or as a vehicle for bringing more Justices together in a single, unified opinion—why else might the Court choose not to pinpoint the most
relevant scrutiny standard? Another possibility is that distinguishing contentbased laws from content-neutral measures may not be an easy chore in any given case—the Justices might be fractured over that issue.50 As Justice Anthony
Kennedy once observed, “Deciding whether a particular regulation is content
based or content neutral is not always a simple task.”51 For example, courts today are divided over whether laws regulating nonconsensual pornography—
sometimes known as revenge porn—are content-based or content-neutral.52 In
brief, as Professor Joseph Blocher recently wrote, “[W]hat constitutes content
discrimination is hardly straightforward.”53
Thus, it frankly may be more expedient in situations where the Justices
may split over whether a statute is content-neutral for them just to assume that
the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard applies rather than to wrestle
with the content-neutrality question, especially if all of the Justices already
know they want to declare the law in question unconstitutional.54 In other
pressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation
of categories, such as ‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.”). In Alvarez, a four-Justice plurality declared that the Stolen Valor Act was content-based and thus
faced what Justice Anthony Kennedy called “exacting scrutiny,” which seemingly meant
strict scrutiny. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724. In applying that test, the plurality declared the law
unconstitutional. Id. at 730. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Elena Kagan, wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed the law was unconstitutional, but he applied the less stringent intermediate scrutiny test in doing so. Id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring). If the plurality also would have struck down the law under intermediate scrutiny, then this would have
provided an instance where the plurality might have simply assumed, for the sake of argument, that the law was content-neutral and also reached the same result.
50 Recall here, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s observation
in Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter that characterizing the sound ordinance at issue there as either content-based or content-neutral was “a very tricky matter.” Harbourside
Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter, 958 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2020).
51 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
52 Compare People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439, 456 (Ill. 2019) (holding that an Illinois statute criminalizing nonconsensual pornography was subject to intermediate scrutiny as “a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction”), with Vermont v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791,
807–08 (Vt. 2019) (concluding that a Vermont statute regulating nonconsensual pornography as a category of speech that was presumptively protected by the First Amendment was
subject to strict scrutiny).
53 Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 321–22 (2019).
54 For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia in McCullen v. Coakley contended that it was unnecessary and wrong for the majority to decide that the statute at issue was content-neutral and
thus did not need to surmount strict scrutiny. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 497–98
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). In embracing a scrutiny-determination avoidance stance in
McCullen, Scalia pointed to the fact that “content neutrality is far from clear (the Court is
divided 5-to-4), and the parties vigorously dispute the point.” Id. at 499. Indeed, “McCullen
v. Coakley demonstrates that the [J]ustices today cannot even agree when a regulation is con-
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words, it might be more efficient, at least in terms of both time and effort, to
adopt an “assuming arguendo” tactic on scrutiny if an unconstitutional end is a
foregone conclusion under the lesser standard of review.55
Even if there were no difficulty or apparent friction among the Justices regarding whether a law was content-based or content-neutral, the interest of judicial economy still might lead the Court to apply the lesser standard if a statute
were so poorly drafted that it would easily fail the narrow-tailoring prong of
intermediate scrutiny. For example, the Court in 2017 in Packingham v. North
Carolina never wrestled with whether a state statute banning access by registered sex offenders to commercial social networking websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, was content-based or content-neutral.56 Instead, the Court
cursorily assumed it was content-neutral and then applied intermediate scrutiny57 to strike it down because it was “unprecedented in the scope of First
Amendment speech it burden[ed].”58 In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice
Anthony Kennedy stressed that the law imposed a “complete bar to the exercise
of First Amendment rights on websites integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”59
Justice Samuel Alito, penning a concurrence in judgment joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred with Justice Kennedy’s sentiment about the law not being sufficiently tailored.60 As Alito put it,
the statute “swe[pt] far too broadly to satisfy the demands of the Free Speech
Clause.”61 Furthermore, Justice Alito joined with the Kennedy majority in content based or content neutral.” Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling:
Muddling Weathered First Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate,
18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 249, 252 (2015).
Given this lack of clarity on the content-neutrality question, Justice Scalia wrote
that “[o]ne would have thought that the Court would avoid the issue by simply assuming
without deciding” that the law was content-neutral. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Because the majority ultimately concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored enough to survive intermediate scrutiny, it necessarily was also not sufficiently tailored
to pass the more rigorous tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny and thus would have been
unconstitutional under either standard. See id. at 490 (concluding, under intermediate scrutiny, that the law at issue “burden[ed] substantially more speech than necessary” to serve the
government’s interests); see also infra Section I.D (addressing McCullen in greater detail).
55 McCullen v. Coakley, which is addressed in the footnote immediately above, provides an
example of such a case where all of the Justices agreed on the outcome but fractured badly
over the level of scrutiny to apply. See supra note 54; see also Trevor Burrus, Injordinances:
Labor Protests, Abortion-Clinic Picketing, and McCullen v. Coakley, 2013–2014 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 167, 167–68 (noting that in McCullen, the Court “unanimously struck down the law
as an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment” despite the Justices disagreeing
about the standard of scrutiny to apply).
56 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733–34 (2017) (describing the statute).
57 Id. at 1736 (“Even making the assumption that the statute is content neutral and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, the provision cannot stand.”).
58 Id. at 1737.
59 Id. at 1738.
60 See id. (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to the law’s “extraordinary breadth”).
61 Id. at 1743.
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cluding it was unnecessary to resolve whether intermediate scrutiny or a higher
standard should apply “because the law in question cannot satisfy the standard
applicable to a content-neutral regulation of the place where speech may occur.”62 In brief, the Justices in Packingham were united in their conclusion that
the North Carolina statute was far too broad, thus dispensing with any need to
debate whether it was content-based or content-neutral.63 Packingham thus illustrates an instance of scrutiny-determination avoidance facilitating judicial
economy where there was no apparent battle among the Justices over whether a
law was content-based or content-neutral.
Furthermore, and returning to part of the discussion in Section A, defaulting to intermediate scrutiny in Packingham also might have stopped Justice
Breyer from writing a separate opinion either complaining that strict scrutiny
was inappropriate or lauding the merits of proportionality.64 In Packingham,
Justice Breyer simply joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court; he did
not write separately.65 Gaining Justice Breyer’s support may have been particularly important for Justice Kennedy because only three other Justices—Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan—joined him.66 If Justice
Breyer had not united with Justice Kennedy, then it would have left Justice
Kennedy’s take on Packingham with only four votes—a mere plurality of the
eight Justices then on the Court.67 In brief, adopting intermediate scrutiny, for
the sake of argument, thus might have been pivotal to Justice Kennedy in keeping Justice Breyer on board with Justice Kennedy’s decision.
C. Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance to Evade the Application of Strict
Scrutiny in All Future Cases Regulating a Specific Variety or Medium of
Expression
Still another reason for engaging in scrutiny-determination avoidance is
that the Justices might not want to establish, as binding precedent on all lower
courts, a hard-and-fast rule that laws regulating a specific variety or medium of
speech must always encounter strict scrutiny and thereby are almost inevitably
unconstitutional. This taps directly into Justice Elena Kagan’s concern with the

62

Id. at 1739.
See, e.g., id. at 1743 (Alito, J., concurring). The sole point of disagreement between the
majority opinion and the concurring opinion was over what Justice Alito dubbed as the majority’s “loose rhetoric” when it came to extolling the virtues of online social media venues
as modern-day public forums akin to public streets and parks. Id. (“The Court should be
more attentive to the implications of its rhetoric for, contrary to the Court’s suggestion, there
are important differences between cyberspace and the physical world.”).
64 See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Breyer’s quibbles with
the Court’s current approach to scrutiny selection).
65 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733 (noting that Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s
opinion).
66 Id.
67 Id. (noting that Justice Neil Gorsuch did not participate in the opinion).
63
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Court’s conclusion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert68 that a sign ordinance was content-based and thus needed to, but ultimately did not, survive strict scrutiny.69
In delivering the Court’s opinion in Reed, Justice Clarence Thomas declared
that the ordinance was facially content-based and thus needed to surmount
strict scrutiny regardless of whether the governmental purpose and motive underlying it were benign or innocuous.70 In other words, after Reed, an innocent
government motive will not save a facially content-based law from strict scrutiny.71
In a concurrence that agreed with the outcome striking down the law but
not with the application of strict scrutiny to do so, Justice Kagan fretted that
“[g]iven the Court’s analysis, many sign ordinances of that kind are now in
jeopardy.”72 She reasoned, in parade-of-horrors fashion about the dangers of
adopting strict scrutiny for sign ordinances, that
on the majority’s view, courts would have to determine that a town has a compelling interest in informing passersby where George Washington slept. And
likewise, courts would have to find that a town has no other way to prevent hidden-driveway mishaps than by specially treating hidden-driveway signs. (Wellplaced speed bumps? Lower speed limits? Or how about just a ban on hidden
driveways?) The consequence—unless courts water down strict scrutiny to
something unrecognizable—is that our communities will find themselves in an
unenviable bind: They will have to either repeal the exemptions that allow for
helpful signs on streets and sidewalks, or else lift their sign restrictions altogether and resign themselves to the resulting clutter.73

The solution, Justice Kagan contended, was the one at the heart of this Article—namely, to apply a lesser standard of review (intermediate scrutiny) because Gilbert’s sign ordinance would not survive it, let alone strict scrutiny. As
she rather caustically wrote, the municipality’s ordinance “does not pass strict
scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”74 There was simply
no need to adopt strict scrutiny—a standard that would jeopardize the constitu68

See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
See id. at 172 (concluding that the sign ordinance failed strict scrutiny); id. at 159–60
(finding that the ordinance imposed more stringent restrictions on temporary directional
signs for certain events than it did for outdoor signs conveying other information and messages).
70 Id. at 167. As Justice Thomas put it:
69

Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based
statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored
speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the
“abridg[ement] of speech”—rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
71 Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax, Everybody, 58 B.C. L. REV. 66, 67
(2017) (noting that after Reed, “[e]ven a benign (or at least non-content-related) purpose
cannot save a law that refers to content from the most rigorous constitutional standard of review”).
72 Reed, 576 U.S. at 180 (Kagan, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 181.
74 Id. at 184.
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tionality of similar sign ordinances nationwide that make distinctions based on
the information signs convey.75 Adopting strict scrutiny to measure the validity
of all such sign ordinances would be tantamount to, as Justice Kagan wrote in
her 2018 dissent in Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, “weaponizing the First Amendment” against workaday regulatory policies.76
To buttress her argument that scrutiny-determination avoidance was proper
in Reed, Justice Kagan cited the Court’s 1994 ruling in City of Ladue v. Gilleo.77 It provides an early instance of the Court “dodg[ing] the question of
whether [an] ordinance was content based or content neutral.”78 Gilleo addressed a First Amendment challenge to a municipal ordinance banning the
display of all residential signs other than those fitting into one of ten exemptions.79 The prohibition broadly swept up window signs inside a person’s residence, including the 8.5-by-11-inch message that Margaret Gilleo posted in a
window in her home reading “For Peace in the Gulf.”80 In analyzing Gilleo’s
challenge to Ladue’s ordinance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded the law was content-based and thus required examination under
strict scrutiny.81 It struck down the ordinance under that standard, holding both
that Ladue’s interests were not compelling and that the law did not use the least
restrictive means of serving those interests.82
The Supreme Court, however, declined to apply strict scrutiny in Gilleo.
Instead, it assumed, for the sake of argument—an argument, in fact, Ladue had
made83—that the law did not discriminate based on content.84 In other words,
the Court engaged in scrutiny-determination avoidance and failed to conclu-

75

See id. at 185 (“Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny
applies to every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a subject-matter
exemption.”).
76 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
77 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
78 Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble
at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 525, 545 (2016).
79 Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 46–47.
80 Id. at 46.
81 Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 1993).
82 Id. at 1184.
83
See Jordan B. Cherrick, Do Communities Have the Right to Protect Homeowners from
Sign Pollution?: The Supreme Court Says No in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 14 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 399, 410 (1995) (“Ladue submitted that its sign ordinance was content-neutral
because its purpose was to advance significant governmental interests—prevention of visual
blight, privacy, safety, the preservation of real estate values—which were unrelated to the
content of the speech on the signs.”).
84 See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 53 (“In examining the propriety of Ladue’s near total prohibition
of residential signs, we will assume, arguendo, the validity of the City’s submission that the
various exemptions are free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination.”).
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sively decide if the law was content-based or content-neutral.85 In what was
then an unusual and unorthodox move, the Court simply assumed the law was
content-neutral without deciding whether that was, in fact, the case.86 The
Court thus considered the law under the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable for content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.87 It concluded the
ordinance collapsed under the weight of that more lenient test because it failed
to leave open sufficient alternative means for residents to convey their views.88
In so holding, the Court stressed the importance of residential signs as a medium of communication that is inexpensive, convenient, important, and closely
identified with the speaker.89
Why might the Gilleo majority have sidestepped the scrutiny determination
issue? One commentator writes that this decision “arguably reflects the unsatisfactory nature of classifying some common ‘utilitarian’ sign ordinance exemptions as either content-based or content-neutral.”90 In other words, the entire
workability of the formulaic, dichotomous framework that largely guides First
Amendment scrutiny determinations is thrown into serious doubt by sign ordinances if one must pigeonhole such measures into a category (content-based or
content-neutral) that largely controls their fate. Rather than jeopardize the integrity of “one of the hardiest and most reliable doctrines in First Amendment
jurisprudence,” the easy way out was to punt on the content-neutrality issue.91

85

See Alan Howard, City of Ladue v. Gilleo: Content Discrimination and the Right to Participate in Public Debate, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 349, 352 (1995) (“Ladue is . . . both
important and surprising for the Court’s decision not to review the issue of whether Ladue’s
ordinance should be viewed as a suspect, content-based law subject to strict scrutiny review.”).
86 See Gerald P. Greiman, City of Ladue v. Gilleo: Free Speech for Signs, a Good Sign for
Free Speech, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 439, 458 (1995) (“It is both unusual and significant that the Supreme Court invalidated Ladue’s ordinance while assuming, without deciding, that it was content-neutral.”); see also Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of First Amendment Protection, 74 NEB. L. REV. 36, 57 (1995)
(calling the Court’s decision “unorthodox” in not “examining the content-distinctions, which
is usually the first step in analysis”).
87 In particular, the Court in Gilleo cited the case of Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) as supplying the correct rule. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56. The
Court in Clark explained that time, place, and manner regulations “are valid provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.” Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
88 See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 56 (“In this case, we are not persuaded that adequate substitutes
exist for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off.”).
89 Id. at 54–58.
90 Marc Rohr, De Minimis Content Discrimination: The Vexing Matter of Sign-Ordinance
Exemptions, 7 ELON L. REV. 327, 330 (2015).
91 Alan Howard, The Mode in the Middle: Recognizing a New Category of Speech Regulations for Modes of Expression, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47, 50 (2007) (“Since the 1970s, the
distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws has been one of the hardiest and
most reliable doctrines in First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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Related to this point and of special importance for this Article, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor penned a concurrence in Gilleo agreeing with the outcome
but questioning the Court’s decision to assume arguendo that intermediate scrutiny applied rather than explicitly adopting strict scrutiny when faced with a
content-based law.92 Calling the Court’s embracement of this option “unusual,”93 O’Connor explained that “[t]he normal inquiry that our doctrine dictates
is, first, to determine whether a regulation is content based or content neutral,
and then, based on the answer to that question, to apply the proper level of
scrutiny.”94 Acknowledging criticism of the Court’s First Amendment regime
pivoting on whether a law is content-based or content-neutral, O’Connor nonetheless would have stuck with this traditional methodology for deciding if strict
scrutiny applied.95 Why? Because, as she wrote, it might
have forced us to confront some of the difficulties with the existing doctrine;
perhaps it would have shown weaknesses in the rule, and led us to modify it to
take into account the special factors this case presents. But such reexamination is
part of the process by which our rules evolve and improve.96

Viewed bluntly, O’Connor suggested that the Court should not have taken
the effortless way out by assuming the law was content-neutral and thereby
dodging the application of strict scrutiny. Instead, it should have confronted
head-on the question of whether the law was content-based. In doing so, if it
deemed the law was content-based, then it might have considered whether strict
scrutiny was truly appropriate to deploy. If, in turn, the Court reasoned that
strict scrutiny was inappropriate, then perhaps the Court might have modified
and finetuned its scrutiny jurisprudence to account for situations like those in
Gilleo. In other words, directly tackling knotty issues is how doctrine progresses and enriches; steering clear from those problems stifles doctrinal growth. In
brief, the Court’s evasive “assuming arguendo” tactic in Gilleo left it for another day—twenty-one years later, in fact—to resolve the problems with sign
regulations that arose again in 2015 in Reed v. Town of Gilbert and left Justice
Kagan thoroughly disenchanted with the Court’s application of strict scrutiny
there.97
Reed and Gilleo thus illustrate two contrasting philosophies when it comes
to scrutiny-determination avoidance. Justice Kagan in Reed called for the Court
to adopt Gilleo’s approach of avoiding strict scrutiny out of her fear that this
92

Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 59 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 60 (“I would have preferred to apply our normal analytical structure in this case,
which may well have required us to examine this law with the scrutiny appropriate to content-based regulations.”).
96 Id.
97 See Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed: Suggestions for
Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 URB. LAW. 569, 570 (2015) (“Reed is the first U.S. Supreme Court case to address local sign regulations since City of Ladue v. Gilleo, decided in
1994.”).
93
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demanding test would jeopardize the constitutionality of all manners of sign
ordinances that make content-based distinctions.98 Conversely, Justice
O’Connor in Gilleo would have squarely confronted and wrestled with the distinct possibility that strict scrutiny was applicable to Ladue’s sign ordinance
and then would have examined how the Court’s content-neutrality doctrine
might have required refinement.99 There are, in short, both pros and cons to
scrutiny-determination avoidance.
D. Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance to Evade Definitive Conclusions in
Cases Featuring Politically and Socially Polarizing Issues, and ScrutinyDetermination Avoidance in the Interest of Stare Decisis
Another reason for evading scrutiny determination—namely, that the Court
should dodge unnecessary questions when other contentious political and social
issues, not simply the First Amendment freedom of speech, are in play—
reverberates through the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence in the
Court’s 2014 decision in McCullen v. Coakley.100 The Court there addressed a
First Amendment free speech challenge to a Massachusetts law that imposed a
thirty-five-foot buffer zone around reproductive health care facilities that perform abortions.101 The law, which limited access to sidewalks and public ways
within that space, applied only during business hours.102 It also exempted from
its reach people entering and exiting those facilities, the facilities’ employees
and agents, police and others working near the facilities, and individuals who
happened to be walking or driving by such venues on their way to other destinations.103
The law was contested by multiple individuals, including Eleanor McCullen, who wanted to engage peacefully in so-called sidewalk counseling with
women entering the facilities and to dissuade them from having abortions.104
The Court’s opinion stressed that McCullen and her colleagues were not ag-

98

See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 184 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (contending that the majority in Reed should have adopted the Court’s tack on scrutiny that it took in
City of Ladue v. Gilleo).
99 See Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that she “would have preferred to apply our normal analytical structure in this case, which may well have required us
to examine this law with the scrutiny appropriate to content-based regulations” and contending that this normal tack might “have forced us to confront some of the difficulties with the
existing doctrine . . . and led us to modify it to take into account the special factors this case
presents. But such reexamination is part of the process by which our rules evolve and improve.”).
100 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 498–501(2014).
101 Id. at 470–72.
102 Id. at 471–72.
103 Id. at 463, 484.
104 Id. at 472–73.
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gressive protestors, but rather were counselors engaged in non-confrontational
speech.105 They claimed the law impeded their speech-based activities.106
In ruling in McCullen, the Justices unanimously concluded that the law
violated the First Amendment, yet they fractured badly over both whether the
law was content-based or content-neutral and the proper level of scrutiny to apply.107 In delivering the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts, who was
joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan, applied the intermediate scrutiny test for time, place, and manner
regulations that the Court created in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.108 That test
allows the government to impose content-neutral restrictions on speech that are
narrowly tailored to serve significant interests and that leave open ample alternative ways for individuals to convey information.109
In applying the Ward test, Chief Justice Roberts began by analyzing
whether Massachusetts’s buffer-zone law was content-neutral.110 He concluded
it was content-neutral, and therefore, strict scrutiny, which generally applies
only when laws are content-based, was irrelevant.111 After resolving Ward’s
content-neutrality prong, Chief Justice Roberts continued on to the other facets
of the test. He next reasoned that Massachusetts possessed significant interests
in protecting public safety, ensuring patient access to the facilities, and promoting the unimpeded flow of pedestrian and vehicular traffic near the facilities.112
Massachusetts’s statute, however, was not yet out of the legal woods, as
Chief Justice Roberts and the majority then turned to the narrow-tailoring
prong.113 The Chief Justice determined the measure flunked this facet of the
Ward standard because the restrictions imposed on the sidewalk counselors
105

Id. at 472.
Id. at 474.
107 Chief Justice John Roberts and the five-Justice majority in McCullen concluded the law
was content-neutral and applied intermediate scrutiny to strike it down. Infra notes 108–119.
In contrast, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas, authored a concurrence concluding that the Massachusetts law “should be reviewed
under the strict-scrutiny standard applicable to content-based legislation.” Id. at 509 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Samuel Alito penned a concurrence contending the law not only was
content-based, but also permitted “blatant viewpoint discrimination.” Id. at 512 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
108 Id. at 477–78. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 293 (2012) (referring to
the standard of review adopted in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) as a
variety of the intermediate scrutiny test).
109 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791–802.
110 See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478 (“The content-neutrality prong of the Ward test is logically antecedent to the narrow tailoring prong, because it determines the appropriate level of
scrutiny. It is not unusual for the Court to proceed sequentially in applying a constitutional
test, even when the preliminary steps turn out not to be dispositive.”).
111 See id. at 485 (“We thus conclude that the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based and
therefore need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny.”).
112 Id. at 486–87.
113 See id. at 486 (describing the narrow-tailoring prong and what is required to satisfy it).
106
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“burden[ed] substantially more speech than [was] necessary to achieve the
Commonwealth’s asserted interests.”114 Massachusetts, he pointed out, had
failed to examine less speech-restrictive means of serving its interests.115 In
fact, Chief Justice Roberts gave significant teeth to intermediate scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring component, making it clear that the government must seriously
undertake less speech-intrusive measures before it may permissibly conclude
that those alternative means are unproductive in serving the asserted interest.116
In other words, the government must do more than just say that alternative
means will not be effective; it must try them out and produce evidence that they
are, in fact, ineffective.117 Furthermore, the government must consider alternative means that other governmental entities have found effective in serving the
asserted interest.118 The Court thus reversed an earlier decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that had upheld the statute.119
The majority’s analysis of the narrow-tailoring issue in McCullen unsurprisingly has been described by another federal appellate court as “rigorous and
fact-intensive.”120 It is a point to which this Article returns in the Conclusion,
as this approach lessens the gap between strict and intermediate scrutiny in the
real-world application of their respective tailoring prongs and, in turn, makes it
somewhat easier for courts to engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance and
to pass on whether strict or intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate.121
Of particular relevance for this Article, Justice Scalia authored a concurrence criticizing the Roberts majority for concluding the statute was contentneutral and thus that it did not need to survive strict scrutiny.122 Joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote that “there
[was] no principled reason for the majority to decide whether the statute [was]
subject to strict scrutiny.”123 Justice Scalia blasted the majority’s resolution of
that question as “eight pages of the purest dicta”124 that was “plainly unnecessary.”125
114

Id. at 490.
See id. at 492 (“The Commonwealth points to a substantial public safety risk created
when protestors obstruct driveways leading to the clinics. . . . That is, however, an example
of its failure to look to less intrusive means of addressing its concerns. Any such obstruction
can readily be addressed through existing local ordinances.” (internal citations omitted)).
116 See id. at 494 (“In short, the Commonwealth has not shown that it seriously undertook to
address the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it.”).
117 See id. at 496 (“Given the vital First Amendment interests at stake, it is not enough for
Massachusetts simply to say that other approaches have not worked.”).
118 See id. at 494 (noting that Massachusetts failed to show “that it considered different
methods that other jurisdictions have found effective”).
119 Id. at 497.
120 Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 372 (3rd Cir. 2016).
121 Infra notes 314–33 and accompanying text.
122 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 497–500 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 498.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 510.
115
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Why was it allegedly unnecessary? Because the Court could have just assumed, for the sake of argument, that the lesser intermediate scrutiny standard
applied and then struck down the law, exactly as it did, under that lesser standard for not being narrowly tailored.126 If a law cannot pass muster under intermediate scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring prong—a prong that does not require that
the means be the least restrictive way of serving the government’s interest, but
only that the means not burden substantially more speech than is needed127—
then it also cannot survive strict scrutiny’s more demanding narrow-tailoring
prong.128 In brief, in Justice Scalia’s view, there was no reason for the Court to
“eagerly volunteer[] to take on the level-of-scrutiny question”129 and, in turn, to
definitively conclude that strict scrutiny did not apply when the Massachusetts
law failed under the lesser intermediate scrutiny standard; adopting an “assuming arguendo” approach in which intermediate scrutiny was applied would have
been sufficient to resolve the case.
Delving deeper into Justice Scalia’s embracement of scrutinydetermination avoidance in McCullen, one readily understands—as explained
below—that his underlying concern regarded the validity of other statutes negatively impacting the ability of those holding anti-abortion viewpoints to express
them near facilities performing that procedure.130 In short, engaging in scrutinydetermination avoidance in First Amendment cases involving politically polarizing and morally divisive issues may be sensible for (1) promoting esprit de
corps and keeping the peace, as it were, among the Justices; and (2) fostering

126

Zachary J. Phillipps, Note, The Unavoidable Implication of McCullen v. Coakley: Protection Against Unwelcome Speech Is Not a Sufficient Justification for Restricting Speech in
Traditional Public Fora, 47 CONN. L. REV. 937, 962 (2015) (“Justice Scalia criticized the
majority’s discussion of content-neutrality, calling it ‘[eight] pages of the purest dicta,’ because the majority’s ultimate conclusion—that the Act could not survive the lesser level of
scrutiny associated with content-neutral regulations—made it unnecessary to determine content-neutrality.”).
127 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989) (“So long as the means
chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, . . . the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative.”).
128 Under strict scrutiny, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s
purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529
U.S. 803, 813 (2000). See Connolly & Weinstein, supra note 97, at 608 (“As the Court made
clear in Ward, narrow tailoring as applied under strict scrutiny is far more demanding than
when applied under intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the regulation be the ‘least restrictive means’ for achieving the compelling governmental interest.”).
129 See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring).
130 Scalia did not believe that the U.S. Constitution protected a woman’s right to choose to
have an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding the right to choose to have an abortion was not a fundamental liberty protected by the Constitution “because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed”).
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judicial legitimacy in the public’s eyes by reducing perceptions of ideological
bias by the Justices in their decision making.131
The danger of ideological bias driving decisions is particularly acute because, as attorney Minch Minchin points out, “the murky definition and uneven
application of the content-neutrality doctrine have given [J]ustices ample wiggle room to make decisions based on their political proclivities rather than doctrinal duties.”132 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McCullen essentially
accused the majority, by definitively resolving that the law was content-neutral,
of reaching a result driven by “its own bias against anti-abortion speakers and
speech.”133 Scrutiny-determination avoidance provides a mechanism for reducing this possibility when larger political and moral controversies underlie First
Amendment issues. Professor Leslie Kendrick explains that “[g]iven that the
context in McCullen was abortion, matters became controversial indeed.”134 In
fact, with the exception of Chief Justice Roberts, the other members of the
Court cleaved neatly along perceived political lines in McCullen when it came
to pinpointing the level of scrutiny.135 Justice Scalia, in turn, was left rather bitterly condemning the decision-making of Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s
perceived liberals.136
Specifically, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan—each
nominated to the nation’s highest court by a Democratic president—joined
Chief Justice Roberts in deeming Massachusetts’s law content-neutral, thereby
subjecting a measure that detrimentally affected the expressive rights of antiabortion counselors to the more deferential intermediate scrutiny standard.137

131

Judicial legitimacy refers to “the overall product of the public’s confidence in the lawfulness, impartiality, and propriety of the judiciary.” Gregory C. Pingree, Where Lies the
Emperor’s Robe? An Inquiry into the Problem of Judicial Legitimacy, 86 OR. L. REV. 1095,
1098 (2007). Maintaining judicial legitimacy is vital because “[p]ositive public perception of
the judiciary’s role in American political life is indispensable to the effectiveness of the judicial branch.” Id. at 1102.
132 Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22
COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 123, 138 (2017).
133 Timothy Zick, Justice Scalia and Abortion Speech, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 288, 289
(2017).
134 Kendrick, supra note 18, at 216.
135 See supra notes 107–08; infra notes 137, 145–46 and accompanying text (addressing the
clustering of the Justices in McCullen).
136 See infra notes 138–40, 143 and accompanying text (providing Justice Scalia’s remarks
denouncing the Court’s decision on the scrutiny issue and reproving the majority for harming the speech rights of individuals holding anti-abortion viewpoints).
137 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 468 (2014) (noting that Chief Justice Roberts
was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); see also Current Members, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., [hereinafter Current Justices] https://www.supremecourt.gov
/about/biographies.aspx [perma.cc/3BZP-R9D5] (identifying Justice Stephen Breyer as having been nominated by President Bill Clinton and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan as having
been nominated by President Barack Obama); Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME CT. OF THE
U.S., [hereinafter Past Justices] https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx
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The majority’s adoption of this lenient test was a boon for other municipalities
attempting to restrain speech near abortion clinics because, as Justice Scalia
wrote, it “preserve[s] the ability of jurisdictions across the country to restrict
antiabortion speech without fear of rigorous constitutional review. With a dart
here and a pleat there, such regulations are sure to satisfy the tailoring standards
applied in . . . the majority’s opinion.”138 He lambasted the majority’s conclusion “that a statute of this sort is not content based and hence not subject to socalled strict scrutiny”139 for accelerating what he called the Court’s “onward
march of abortion-speech-only jurisprudence.”140
In other words, Justice Scalia perceived the long-term effect of the majority’s scrutiny-selection decision as a pro-choice victory and a pro-life defeat for
speech regarding abortion.141 Although Massachusetts lawmakers lost the battle
when their statute failed intermediate scrutiny for not being narrowly tailored,
lawmakers elsewhere won the war because they now had a roadmap from the
Chief Justice for how to better draft buffer-zone laws to pass constitutional
muster.142 In Justice Scalia’s frank words, the majority’s decision to definitively adopt intermediate scrutiny, rather than just assuming arguendo that it applied in this instance, handed “abortion-rights advocates a pass when it comes
to suppressing the free-speech rights of their opponents.”143
As noted earlier,144 Justice Scalia was joined by fellow conservative-tilting
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, each nominated by a Republican president, in
his concurrence in which they would have applied strict scrutiny when evaluating Massachusetts’s statute.145 Furthermore, conservative-leaning Justice Samuel Alito, a nominee of President George W. Bush, wrote a separate concurrence in which he held that the law went beyond content discrimination to
actually discriminate against a viewpoint and thus was unconstitutional.146 Alt[perma.cc/H4WE-87BU] (identifying Justice Ginsburg as having been nominated by President Bill Clinton).
138 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 497.
140 Id.
141 See Timothy Zick, Rights Speech, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 20 (2014) (remarking that
under Justice Scalia’s concurrence, “the Court stands accused of allowing the state to alter
abortion rights discourse by discriminating against pro-life advocacy”).
142 As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “In discussing whether the Act is narrowly tailored, . . . we identify a number of less-restrictive alternative measures that the Massachusetts Legislature might have adopted.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479.
143 Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144
See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas).
145 See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 509 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In sum, the Act should be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard applicable to content-based legislation.”); see also
Current Justices, supra note 137 (identifying Justice Kennedy as having been nominated by
President Ronald Reagan and Justice Thomas as having been nominated by President George
H.W. Bush); Past Justices, supra note 137 (identifying Justice Scalia as having been nominated by President Ronald Reagan).
146 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 511–12 (Alito, J., concurring).
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hough Justice Alito did not state that he was applying strict scrutiny, laws that
discriminate based upon a viewpoint are “subject to rigorous constitutional
scrutiny”147 because they represent “an egregious form of content discrimination.”148 The conservative Justices, by embracing strict scrutiny, thus would
have made it much tougher for future buffer-zone laws such as Massachusetts’s
statute to clear First Amendment scrutiny than their liberal colleagues did by
deploying intermediate scrutiny. In sum, by selecting different scrutiny standards, the liberal Justices (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) in McCullen issued a
decision favorable to municipalities attempting to restrict the speech of antiabortion advocates, while the Court’s four other conservatives rendered opinions much more friendly to anti-abortion expressive activities.
Importantly, Chief Justice Roberts pushed back at Justice Scalia’s attack on
the majority’s decision to definitively resolve that intermediate scrutiny was,
indeed, the correct standard and that strict scrutiny was inapplicable. Chief Justice Roberts readily acknowledged that “[t]he Court does sometimes assume,
without deciding, that a law is subject to a less stringent level of scrutiny.”149
He also noted that the Court had recently done so in McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission,150 a case decided less than three months before McCullen.151
The Justices in McCutcheon split five to four along perceived political
lines in declaring that a federal law capping the aggregate sum of money a donor could give to all candidates or committees violated the First Amendment
freedom of speech.152 In delivering the Court’s opinion, Chief Justice Roberts
confronted the question of whether strict scrutiny or a less rigorous standard
that the Court had created in Buckley v. Valeo153 for campaign contributions—a
test featuring a closely-drawn means requirement—should be applied to measure the constitutionality of the aggregate monetary cap.154 Buckley’s closely-

147

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
149 McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478.
150 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S.185 (2014).
151 See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 478 (citing McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199).
152 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 192–93. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court in
McCutcheon and was joined by fellow conservative Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito. Id.
at 190. Additionally, conservative Justice Clarence Thomas penned a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 228 (Thomas, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Stephen
Breyer authored a dissent that was joined by fellow liberal Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan. Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
154 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199. In articulating the standard of scrutiny for contribution
limits in Buckley, the Court wrote that “[e]ven a ‘ “significant interference” with protected
rights of political association’ may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93
148
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drawn test sometimes is referred to as intermediate scrutiny.155 Chief Justice
Roberts concluded in McCutcheon that the statute, due to being improperly tailored in scope, would flunk the more relaxed Buckley test, thus rendering it unnecessary to definitively choose whether it or strict scrutiny was more appropriate.156
Reflecting back on the Court’s decision to engage in scrutinydetermination avoidance in McCutcheon, the Chief Justice explained in McCullen that applying any standard of review other than intermediate scrutiny,
which the Court assumed applied, “would have required overruling a precedent.”157 This is important not only because Chief Justice Roberts equated the
closely-drawn test from Buckley with intermediate scrutiny, but also because it
suggests yet another reason for the Supreme Court to dodge on scrutiny: stare
decisis.158
Stare decisis, as Justice Neil Gorsuch recently encapsulated it, advances
“the goals of predictability and reliance.”159 In other words, following precedent allows decisions to be predictable and consistent, permitting the legal system and the public to rely on prior rulings.160 Following precedent also supposedly builds, in the eyes of the public, the Court’s legitimacy.161

(1973), the Court called the Buckley closely drawn standard “less rigorous” than strict scrutiny. Id. at 137.
155 See Ivet A. Bell, The Constitutionality of the SEC Pay to Play Rule: Why 206(4)-5 Survives the Deregulatory Trend in Campaign Finance, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 16–17
(2015) (noting that the level of scrutiny for campaign contributions established in Buckley
“has been variably referred to as the ‘closely drawn test’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny’ ”).
156 See McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 199. (“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the
Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail
even under the ‘closely drawn’ test. We therefore need not parse the differences between the
two standards in this case.”).
157 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
158 Stare decisis entails “[f]idelity to precedent.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377
(2010). See Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court,
2018 SUP. CT. REV. 121, 126 (“[T]he expectation embodied in the idea of stare decisis is that
judges of a court will, presumptively even if not conclusively, follow the previous decisions
of that court . . . even if and when they think the previous decisions are mistaken.”).
159 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1403 (2020).
160 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”).
161 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional
Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudence of Oprah!, 90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2105
(2002) (“Stare decisis bears an important relationship to judicial legitimacy.”); Derigan Silver & Dan V. Kozlowski, Preserving the Law’s Coherence: Citizens United v. FEC and
Stare Decisis, 21 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 39, 48 (2016) (“A recurring argument in the literature is that overruling precedent jeopardizes public support for the Court and the institution’s
legitimacy.”).
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While the Court is not bound to follow its prior decisions,162 overruling
precedent—abrogating the principle of stare decisis—requires “strong grounds
for doing so,” as Justice Samuel Alito wrote in 2018.163 One such strong
ground is when a prior decision “wrongly denied First Amendment rights.”164
While Justice Clarence Thomas has called for overruling Buckley—the case
that supplied the scrutiny test that Chief Justice Roberts assumed applied in
McCutcheon—the case now has been relied on for more than four decades
since it was decided in 1976.165 As Justice Scalia wrote in 2007, “Buckley set
forth a now-familiar framework for evaluating the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations.”166 Additionally, the majority in 2010 in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission167 leaned heavily on certain propositions from Buckley.168
In summary, engaging in scrutiny-determination avoidance in McCutcheon
by merely assuming that Buckley’s standard applied and, in turn, striking down
the law under that test permitted the Court to avoid both overruling precedent
and violating the principle of stare decisis.169 McCullen, by way of contrast as
Chief Justice Roberts contended, held no such danger of overruling precedent
by conclusively resolving that intermediate scrutiny was the more appropriate
test.170

162

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (noting that stare decisis “is not . . . an
inexorable command”).
163 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478
(2018).
164 Id.
165 In McCutcheon, Justice Thomas wrote that he “adhere[s] to the view that this Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Valeo . . . denigrates core First Amendment speech and should be
overruled.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 228 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). In 2006, Justice Thomas explained that:
I continue to believe that Buckley provides insufficient protection to political speech, the core of
the First Amendment. The illegitimacy of Buckley is further underscored by the continuing inability of the Court (and the plurality here) to apply Buckley in a coherent and principled fashion.
As a result, stare decisis should pose no bar to overruling Buckley and replacing it with a standard faithful to the First Amendment.

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 US 230, 266 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring).
166 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 486 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
167 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
168 See id. at 345–60 (addressing the relevance of Buckley).
169 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
170 See id. at 478–79 (“Applying any standard of review other than intermediate scrutiny in
McCutcheon—the standard that was assumed to apply—would have required overruling a
precedent. There is no similar reason to forgo the ordinary order of operations in this case.”).
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E. Scrutiny-Determination Avoidance in Emerging Doctrinal Areas of First
Amendment Law
In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra,171 a
five-Justice, conservative-leaning majority of the Court held that part of a California law compelling pro-life crisis pregnancy centers to provide truthful information to patients about the availability of state-sponsored free and low-cost
abortion services likely violated the centers’ First Amendment right of free
speech.172 More specifically, the free speech interest likely violated was the unenumerated right not to speak—a right not to be compelled to communicate a
government-scripted message.173 In delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice
Clarence Thomas deemed the law content-based because it forced the centers to
utter a California-sponsored message, thereby altering and diluting the centers’
own pro-life message.174
Concluding that a law is content-based normally triggers strict scrutiny, as
addressed earlier.175 Yet the majority engaged in scrutiny-determination avoidance and did not apply strict scrutiny, reasoning instead that the law “cannot
survive even intermediate scrutiny.”176 In applying that more relaxed standard,
the majority initially assumed California possessed a substantial interest in notifying low-income women about state-sponsored pregnancy and abortion services.177 The law, however, failed to pass muster under the tailoring prong of

171

Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch. Id. at 2367. Justice Stephen
Breyer authored a dissenting opinion that was joined Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia
Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Erwin Chemerinsky &
Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v.
Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 91 (2019) (noting that the Court in NIFLA “split along ideological lines” in a five-to-four decision).
172 See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their
challenge to the licensed notice.”); see also id. at 2368 (“Licensed clinics must notify women
that California provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give them a
phone number to call.”).
173 See Erica Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV.
639, 643 (2019) (describing NIFLA as “a compelled speech case” in which the Court held
“that requiring anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers to alert patrons to the fact that the state
can provide low cost abortions violated the centers’ First Amendment rights against compelled speech”); Genevieve Lakier, Not Such a Fixed Star After All: West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, and the Changing Meaning of the First Amendment Right
Not to Speak, 13 FIU L. REV. 741, 763 (2019) (describing the Court’s ruling in NIFLA as
embracing an “expansive, autonomy-focused conception of the First Amendment right not to
speak” that prioritizes protection of the autonomy interests of those being compelled to
speak over the right of listeners to receive factual information).
174 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371.
175 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
176 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
177 Id.
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intermediate scrutiny.178 Specifically, Justice Thomas called it “wildly underinclusive”179 in serving its goal because its compelled-notice provision failed to
apply to numerous other community and federal clinics that also could educate
low-income women about state-provided abortion services.180 In other words,
by exempting multiple other clinics from its reach, the law simply did too little—it was too narrowly tailored—to address the educational interest it was
supposed to serve.181 This gaping gulf between California’s stated purpose and
the law’s miniscule scope doomed it, at least in the majority’s eyes.182
Justice Thomas’s critique of the law’s problematic tailoring, however, did
not end with the measure’s underinclusivity. He also pointed to the existence of
alternative ways California might inform women about state-sponsored abortion services without infringing the speech rights of crisis pregnancy centers.183
To wit, Justice Thomas wrote that California could “inform the women itself
with a public-information campaign”184 and “post the information on public
property near crisis pregnancy centers.”185
The state alleged that it had, in fact, used an advertising campaign and that
“many women who are eligible for publicly-funded healthcare have not enrolled.”186 This, however, failed to quell Justice Thomas’s concerns. He asserted that a lukewarm response by women did not by itself prove that an ad campaign was an inadequate alternative means of serving the state’s interest.187
Justice Thomas advanced other reasons why the response might have been tepid, including women simply not wanting the services offered and California
failing to invest enough resources into its campaign to be effective.188 As addressed later in this Article’s Conclusion, the NIFLA majority’s analysis here is
important: it suggests that the gap separating strict scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring
component from intermediate scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring facet—in terms of
their practical application—may be very slim.189 If that is the case, then a negligible difference between the two tailoring components may mean that default178

Id.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n., 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).
180 Id. at 2375–76. Specifically, the measure exempted from its reach “several categories of
clinics that would otherwise qualify as licensed covered facilities.” Id. at 2369.
181 See Calvert, supra note 78, at 528 (noting that “a law may be fatally underinclusive”
when “the government regulates too little speech to prevent or mitigate a particular type of
harm” that may arise from unregulated speech).
182 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376
(2018) (asserting that the law’s “exemption for these clinics, which serve many women who
are pregnant or could become pregnant in the future, demonstrates the disconnect between its
stated purpose and its actual scope”).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Infra notes 315–19 and accompanying text.
179
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ing to intermediate review via scrutiny-determination avoidance, rather than
conclusively selecting strict scrutiny, is more of a symbolic gesture than a substantively meaningful maneuver.
Why did Justice Thomas and the majority fail to adopt strict scrutiny when
they were confronted with a content-based law? After all, Justice Thomas wrote
the Court’s opinion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert190 just three years earlier. Reed
made it clear that laws that are content-based, either on their face or because of
an illicit government purpose, must surmount strict scrutiny.191 The answer
may be this: because the Court in NIFLA addressed a statute’s constitutionality
within the macro-level context of evaluating the viability of a nascent First
Amendment doctrine—namely, professional speech—it was reticent to render a
definitive ruling on scrutiny that would bind and constrict that inchoate doctrine’s future.192
Specifically, prior to NIFLA reaching the Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had chosen not to apply strict scrutiny because it
concluded the law regulated the speech of professionals—those working in the
state-licensed crisis pregnancy centers—and that, in turn, such professional
speech could be more easily regulated by the government under intermediate
scrutiny.193 The Ninth Circuit, in fact, upheld the law under that standard, concluding it was narrowly tailored194 to serve California’s “substantial interest in
the health of its citizens, including ensuring that its citizens have access to and
adequate information about constitutionally-protected medical services like
abortion.”195
Justice Thomas and majority, however, rejected the Ninth Circuit’s stance
that a distinct category of expression known as professional speech exists that
is always exempt from the Court’s normal scrutiny rules.196 Thomas noted that
under current First Amendment principles, laws regulating the speech of professionals face lesser standards of judicial review in only two situations: (1)
190

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
Id. at 163–64.
192 See Mark Strasser, Deception, Professional Speech, and CPCs: On Becerra, Abortion,
and the First Amendment, 67 BUFFALO L. REV. 311 (2019) (providing an overview of the
regulation of professional speech, including the Supreme Court’s analysis of the professional
speech issue in NIFLA); John G. Wrench & Arif Panju, A Counter-Majoritarian Bulwark:
The First Amendment and Professional Speech in the Wake of NIFLA v. Becerra, 24 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 453 (2020) (addressing the regulation of professional speech and the Supreme Court’s analysis of it in NIFLA).
193 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 839–40 (9th Cir. 2016),
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (finding that “the Licensed Notice regulates professional
speech” and that “intermediate scrutiny applies”).
194 Id. at 842. The Ninth Circuit remarked that “[t]he Notice informs the reader only of the
existence of publicly-funded family-planning services. It does not contain any more speech
than necessary, nor does it encourage, suggest, or imply that women should use those statefunded services.” Id.
195 Id. at 841.
196 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
191
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when statutes require professionals to disclose certain factual information in
advertisements for their services197 and (2) when laws regulating professional
conduct incidentally burden speech, such as informed-consent mandates imposed on doctors attendant to procedures they perform.198 The majority found
that California’s law targeting licensed crisis pregnancy centers fit within neither of these exceptions to the general rule that content-based laws, including
those governing professional speech, must survive strict scrutiny.199
The majority, however, did not slam the door completely shut on the possibility that professional speech might be subject to review under something less
stringent than strict scrutiny in other situations. As Justice Thomas explained:
[N]either California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for
treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary
First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such
reason exists. We need not do so because the licensed notice cannot survive
even intermediate scrutiny.200

In brief, the majority held open the prospect that a unique, strict-scrutiny
immune category of expression called professional speech might exist, concluding only that California and the Ninth Circuit failed to prove that it does
exist.201 Applying strict scrutiny to California’s law, in turn, might have signaled to lower courts that such a carveout from the general rules of scrutiny
was an impossibility. That would have put to rest, once and for all time, the
possibility of professional speech becoming a special niche of First Amendment law—one akin to commercial speech, which is subject to intermediate
197

Id. at 1372. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that a state permissibly may compel attorneys to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in their advertisements “as long as [the] disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” and the
regulations are not “unduly burdensome”); see also Shannon M. Roesler, Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 505 (2018) (“Many courts and commentators
have treated the Zauderer ‘reasonable relationship’ test as a highly deferential test similar to
rational basis review.”).
198 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
884–85 (1992) (holding that a rule compelling doctors to provide factual information to patients “about the risks of abortion, and childbirth” as part of an informed-consent mandate
incidental to performing abortions was “a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed” and noting that physicians are “subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State” when they are speaking “as part of the practice of medicine”); see also B.
Jessie Hill, Sex, Lies, and Ultrasound, 89 U. COLO . L. REV. 421, 432 (2018) (“The Court’s
language of reasonableness, along with its dismissive treatment of the claim, suggest something like rational basis review was applied to the physician’s free speech claim.”).
199 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372–74.
200 Id. at 2375 (emphasis added).
201 Cf. William D. Araiza, Invasion of the Content-Neutrality Rule, 2019 BYU L. REV. 875,
891 (2019) (describing how the NIFLA majority rebuffed the notion “that the professionalspeech context of the California law constituted ‘a unique category [of speech] that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.’ It then assumed that such ‘a unique category’ did exist, because it concluded that, even if it did, the law in question would fail intermediate scrutiny.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)).
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scrutiny despite it constituting a specific variety of content.202 There was no
need to reach that scrutiny determination in NIFLA, however, because California’s law would not, at least in the majority’s view, surmount the lesser intermediate scrutiny standard. In short, the majority’s decision to punt on scrutiny—to apply intermediate scrutiny, even in the face of a content-based law,
because it would not have made any difference if either that test or strict scrutiny were applied—left open the opportunity for a new First Amendment doctrine (professional speech) to emerge if better reasons are later brought to the
legal table.203
Viewed in this light, NIFLA embodies judicial minimalism because the majority leaves for another day, via scrutiny-determination avoidance, the possibility of “treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from
ordinary First Amendment principles.”204 It was, as Dean Rodney Smolla succinctly encapsulated it, a “modest hedge” against unforeseen circumstances.205
The Court’s dodge on scrutiny in NIFLA means, in other words, that it “has yet
to settle on its First Amendment approach to professional speech.”206
It therefore is too early when it comes to professional speech to conclude
that the NIFLA majority, as some have contended, “put this runaway doctrine to
rest.”207 Instead, after NIFLA, it perhaps is better to conclude that “there might
be such a thing as professional speech—sometimes.”208 At least one lower
court, in fact, has understood NIFLA as standing for a maybe-it-exists proposition.209

202

Although commercial speech is a particular type of content, laws regulating it are subject
to review not under strict scrutiny, but under a test more akin to intermediate scrutiny. See
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (noting that
the Supreme Court has held “that restrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity must withstand intermediate scrutiny”); see also Tamara R. Piety, Market
Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go
Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) (“[T]he commercial speech doctrine creates a
category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.”).
203 See Rodney A. Smolla, The Tensions Between Regulation of the Legal Profession and
Protection of the First Amendment Rights of Lawyers and Judges: A Tribute to Ronald Rotunda, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 285, 294 (2019) (observing that in NIFLA, the Court “did not foreclose the slim possibility that in some future scenario there might be a case for reduced scrutiny of the regulation of professionals”).
204 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2375.
205 Smolla, supra note 203, at 294.
206 Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 441, 460
(2019).
207 Wrench & Panju, supra note 192, at 480.
208 Miller & Berkman, supra note 15, at 623.
209 See Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 353 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“While
NIFLA disparaged the use of ‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech, it did
not foreclose the possibility that reasons might exist for treating professional speech as a
separate category.”).
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Of course, NIFLA still is highly problematic because assigning an appropriate level of scrutiny in future professional speech cases “remains elusive.”210
For example, Professor Carl Coleman points out in light of NIFLA that “unless
and until the Supreme Court expressly rules otherwise, there is no reason for
courts reviewing regulations of physician-patient communications to assume
that strict scrutiny necessarily applies.”211 In brief, punting on scrutiny leaves
lower courts in limbo.
There is a possible alternative reason why the NIFLA majority opted to not
apply strict scrutiny when faced with a content-based law. It relates to Justice
Breyer’s dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, that
bluntly criticized the Court’s entire formulaic approach for selecting scrutiny
based on whether a law is content-based or content-neutral.212 Specifically, the
dissenting bloc of liberal Justices worried that deploying this methodology on
all laws that compel speech would jeopardize all manners of seemingly innocuous regulations:
Because much, perhaps most, human behavior takes place through speech and
because much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content,
the majority’s approach at the least threatens considerable litigation over the
constitutional validity of much, perhaps most, government regulation. Virtually
every disclosure law could be considered “content based,” for virtually every
disclosure law requires individuals “to speak a particular message.” 213

Justice Breyer built here from his similar criticism of this categorical approach to scrutiny determination in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.214 He wrote there
that “[r]egulatory programs almost always require content discrimination. And
to hold that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.”215
Additionally, and as noted earlier, Justice Breyer long has advocated for a proportionality approach to scrutiny that focuses more on the First Amendment interests at stake and the harm a statute might cause them.216
210

Miller & Berkman, supra note 15, at 623–24.
Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 874 (2019).
212 See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“This constitutional approach threatens to create serious
problems.”).
213 Id. (quoting Justice Thomas’s use of the phrase “to speak a particular message” in the
majority opinion).
214 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 176 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view,
the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here,
as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.”).
215 Id. at 177.
216 Supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text; see also Clay Calvert, Testing the First
Amendment Validity of Laws Banning Sexual Orientation Change Efforts on Minors: What
Level of Scrutiny Applies After Becerra and Does a Proportionality Approach Provide a Solution?, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 31–34 (2019) (summarizing Justice Breyer’s proportionality approach to scrutiny).
211
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The dissenters in NIFLA, in contrast to the majority, would not have applied heightened scrutiny—be it strict or intermediate—when evaluating the
constitutionality of California’s law compelling licensed crisis pregnancy centers to disclose the availability of state-funded abortion services.217 Instead,
they would have adopted either of the two more deferential standards the NIFLA majority deemed inapt—namely, the rules that govern when the government compels professionals to disclose factual information in their advertisements and when doctors are forced to disclose facts to patients under informedconsent mandates.218 In brief, the dissent would have embraced either the rule
for compelling speech in professionals’ advertisements from Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel219 or the standard for compelling physicians to speak in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.220
Perhaps, then, the conservative NIFLA majority—although openly hostile
to abortion, as Dean Erwin Chemerinsky emphasizes221—did not want to further exacerbate the friction over scrutiny selection in compelled-speech cases
that definitively choosing strict scrutiny might have fueled. Specifically, adopting strict security, rather than using intermediate scrutiny, would have created a
wider gap between the majority’s preferred test (strict scrutiny) and the dissent’s desired standard of something akin to rational basis review.222 Charitably
viewed in this light, the majority, rather than rigidly applying strict scrutiny,
particularly in a case involving the politically and morally polarizing issue that
is abortion, held open the possibility that Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s scrutiny
logic does not inevitably demand that content-based laws face strict scrutiny.223
217

See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“There is no reason to subject
such laws to heightened scrutiny.”).
218 See supra notes 197–98 (addressing these two exceptions from the general rule that strict
scrutiny applies when professional speech is regulated); see also NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2384–
88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing the relevance and applicability of these standards in
NIFLA).
219 See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626 (1985); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at
2386–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing the relevancy of Zauderer).
220 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at
2384–86 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing the relevancy of Casey).
221 See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 171, at 66 (“Becerra is only secondarily about
speech. Instead, we believe this case is primarily about five conservative Justices’ hostility to
abortion rights. The Court ignored legal precedent, failed to weigh the interests at stake in its
decision, and applied a more demanding standard based on content of speech.”).
222 The test from Zauderer that the NIFLA dissent found applicable has been equated with
rational basis review. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say
about the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 855, 974 (2010). Indeed, former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post refers to
Zauderer as establishing “an extraordinarily lenient test for the review of compelled commercial speech.” Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial
Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40
VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 560 (2006).
223 See supra Section I.D (addressing the use of scrutiny-determination avoidance to evade
definitive conclusions in cases featuring politically and socially polarizing issues).
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This, of course, is an altruistic interpretation of the majority’s approach to scrutiny-determination avoidance in NIFLA. As described earlier in this Section, an
alternative explanation is that the majority did not want to wholly preclude the
development of a nascent professional speech doctrine, just in case more persuasive reasons for cultivating it were to come down the legal pike than those
proffered by California and the Ninth Circuit.
With this review in mind of multiple reasons why the Supreme Court might
engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance, as well as criticisms of that tactic
offered by Justice O’Connor in Gilleo, the Article next returns to the trio of
2020 federal appellate court decisions mentioned in the Introduction. In particular, Part II addresses the doctrinal problems these cases illustrate about formulaically relying on the difference between content-based and content-neutral
laws to determine the level of scrutiny.
II. SCRUTINY-DETERMINATION AVOIDANCE IN THE FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS IN 2020: EXPOSING PROBLEMS WITH SELECTING A STANDARD OF
REVIEW
This Part analyzes problems with the First Amendment scrutiny selection
process that are revealed by the three federal appellate court opinions described
in the Introduction in which courts engaged in scrutiny-determination avoidance. Those cases are addressed separately in the order raised in the Introduction.
A. Billups v. City of Charleston224
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Billups engaged in
scrutiny-determination avoidance when it considered whether Charleston,
South Carolina’s examination and licensing requirement imposed on individuals seeking to lead paid tours of that city violated the First Amendment right of
free speech.225 As discussed in the Introduction, the Fourth Circuit found the
ordinance merited First Amendment scrutiny because it implicated protected
speech.226 The appellate court, however, then declined to decide whether the
ordinance was content-neutral or content-based and, in turn, passed on determining whether strict or intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate.227

224

Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2020).
See id. at 676 (“[B]efore leading a paid tour through Charleston’s historic districts, a prospective guide must obtain a license. And to obtain that license, a prospective guide must
pass a 200-question written examination that focuses on Charleston’s history, architecture,
and historic preservation efforts.”).
226 See id. at 684 (“In short, the business of leading tours depends on the expression of ideas.
And the Ordinance forbids unlicensed tour guides for hire from expressing those ideas on
public thoroughfares. Such a restriction burdens protected speech and thus implicates the
First Amendment.”).
227 Id. at 684–85.
225
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In doing so, the Fourth Circuit reasoned there was no “hard-and-fast rule
requiring that courts confront the content-neutrality question in every case.”228
It rejected the idea that the Supreme Court’s choice to resolve the scrutiny issue
in McCullen v. Coakley when it did not need to do so created such a mustchoose rule.229 As discussed earlier, Justice Scalia authored a concurrence that
vehemently criticized the majority in McCullen for definitively concluding that
intermediate scrutiny was more appropriate than strict scrutiny.230 The Fourth
Circuit in Billups took note of Justice Scalia’s denunciation, using it to support
the contention that conclusively resolving the level of scrutiny when it is unnecessary is “not uncontroversial.”231 In short, Justice Scalia’s adamant
pushback on scrutiny selection in McCullen provided cover for the Fourth Circuit’s decision to embrace scrutiny-determination avoidance.
The Fourth Circuit, in fact, was also following the lead of U.S. District
Judge David Norton in his earlier ruling in Billups.232 Judge Norton had concluded there was “no need to answer [the] question”233 of whether the ordinance was content-based or content-neutral because it “fail[ed] to pass constitutional muster even under the more lenient intermediate scrutiny standard
applied to content-neutral laws.”234 Applying intermediate scrutiny, Judge Norton found that while Charleston possessed a significant interest in safeguarding
tourists and the city’s tourism industry, the ordinance was not narrowly tailored
because Charleston failed to show that it actually had attempted to use less
speech-restrictive means to serve that interest and that those means were ineffective.235 As Judge Norton straightforwardly put it, Charleston “presented no
evidence that it ever investigated much less ‘tried’ any less restrictive alternative.”236 This requirement for narrow tailoring tracks McCullen’s mandate, described earlier, that governmental entities must do more than just assert, without supporting evidence, that alternative measures will be unsuccessful in
serving the alleged interest.237
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Judge Norton’s analysis. It found that while
the ordinance served a significant interest, it was not narrowly tailored in doing
so.238 As with Judge Norton’s conclusion, the appellate court also found that
228

Id. at 685.
Id. at 684–85.
230 See supra notes 122–29 (addressing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in McCullen).
231 Billups, 961 F.3d at 685.
232 Billups v. City of Charleston, 331 F. Supp. 3d 500 (D.S.C. 2018), aff’d, 961 F.3d 673
(4th Cir. 2020).
233 Id. at 512.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 512–13.
236 Id. at 517.
237 See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text (addressing this facet of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of narrow tailoring in McCullen).
238 See Billups v. City of Charleston, 961 F.3d 673, 685 (4th Cir. 2020) (“Like the district
court’s, our analysis begins and ends with the conclusion that—although the Ordinance
229
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Charleston had failed to offer evidence that it had tried to use “less intrusive
tools [that were] readily available to it.”239
Beyond following the principle of judicial minimalism, why else might the
Fourth Circuit in Billups have decided to pass on picking a definitive level of
scrutiny? The answer likely is that Billups is part of a rising tide of cases involving First Amendment challenges to licensing schemes—a tide into which
the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to wade and offer guidance, but which has produced splits among the lower courts.240 These cases pit the ability of governmental entities, legislating in the name of public and consumer health and safety and welfare concerns, to license individuals before they can engage in
certain professions against the First Amendment speech rights of individuals
who want to be in those professions.241 Tour-guide cases such as Billups, in
turn, raise clear First Amendment issues because they involve a “speaking occupation”—a profession where people must speak as a key part of their job.242
But deciding whether heightened scrutiny applies and, if so, what level—strict
or intermediate—of heightened scrutiny applies is not always so clear.243
These disputes, as Professor Claudia Haupt points out, arise “against the
larger jurisprudential backdrop that is the current debate over the deregulatory
use of the First Amendment in pursuit of a laissez faire, Lochner-style market.”244 This worry about First Amendment Lochnerism245 is the same concern
serves the City’s significant interest in protecting Charleston’s tourism industry—the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored.”).
239 Id. at 690.
240 See Amanda Shanor, Business Licensing and Constitutional Liberty, 126 YALE L.J.F.
314, 318 (2016) (“Recent occupational licensing cases have provoked considerable disagreement and created several circuit splits. The Fifth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit
have diverged, for instance, over whether a requirement that tour guides acquire a business
license violates the First Amendment.”).
241 See Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. 501, 511 (2019) (“Licensing requirements are based on the states’ police powers to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens, and they are routinely justified by invoking protection of the public
as the underlying rationale.”).
242 Shanor, supra note 240, at 320.
243 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently considered a First
Amendment challenge to a California statute that requires certain individuals to pass an examination before they can gain admission to study at a private postsecondary school in order
to become professional farriers (i.e., horseshoers). Pac. Coast Horseshoeing Sch., Inc. v.
Kirchmeyer, 961 F.3d 1062, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
measure implicated First Amendment speech concerns but left “it to the district court on remand to determine whether this case involves commercial or non-commercial speech,
whether California must satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny, . . . and whether it can carry
its burden under either standard.” Id. at 1074 (internal citation omitted).
244 Haupt, supra note 241, at 504; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional, as an interference with the right to contract under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute limiting the number of hours that a
baker could work); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional
(and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 407 (2016) (noting that in the so-called
Lochner era, the Court declared invalid many laws “for infringing freedom of contract”).
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that largely animated both Justice Breyer’s rationale for not applying heightened scrutiny in NIFLA246 and Justice Kagan’s decrial of the weaponization of
the First Amendment, via the application of heightened scrutiny, to attack
workaday economic regulations.247 In brief, both liberal-leaning Justices and
leading scholars are concerned that “the First Amendment has become a blunt
tool of deregulation.”248 The argument against the application of heightened
First Amendment scrutiny in cases such as Billups is that the licensing ordinances amount to economic regulations intended to protect consumers and clients under the government’s police powers and thus should be subject to mere
rational basis review.249
On the other hand, some contend that such measures must face strict scrutiny. Paul Sherman, a senior attorney for the Institute of Justice, an organization
that frequently challenges licensing schemes on First Amendment grounds,250
asserts that “where an occupational-licensing law burdens speech and the government can neither satisfy strict scrutiny nor provide evidence that the narrowly defined category of regulated speech has been considered historically unprotected, the law violates the First Amendment.”251
245

See Enrique Armijo, Faint-Hearted First Amendment Lochnerism, 100 B.U. L. REV.
1377, 1380 (2020) (defining First Amendment Lochnerism as “the claim that the Court’s
conservative majority, at the urging of commercial and other powerful interests and following its own antiregulatory agenda, has turned the constitutional protection for free speech
into a tool with which to blow holes in the regulatory state”).
246 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Breyer’s concern
here in NIFLA).
247 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Kagan’s concern here in
Janus).
248 Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 172 (2017);
see also Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 335, 337 (2017) (describing how some scholars perceive “a new free speech Lochnerism—an exploitation of the First Amendment to promote a broad deregulatory agenda,
regardless of popular democratic will”).
249 See Chemerinsky, supra note 244, at 403 (“[T]he Court has basically gotten it right about
when to apply the rational basis test—using it to analyze government economic regulations
and social welfare legislation when there is no discrimination based on a suspect classification or infringement of a fundamental right.”); Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis
Review, 63 VILL. L. REV. 79, 79 (2018) (remarking that rational basis scrutiny “typically [is]
applied to review of economic and social regulations”); see also Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J.F. 185, 190 (2018) (“Licensing regimes are state
laws enacted under the states’ police powers.”).
250 See Paul Sherman, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/staff/psherman/ [perma.cc/Y5NC9NDR] (“Paul [Sherman] has extensive experience litigating First Amendment cases and has
helped to develop IJ’s occupational-speech practice, which seeks to create greater constitutional protection against occupational-licensing laws that burden speech.”).
251 Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
183, 193 (2015). The language in Sherman’s quotation regarding historically unprotected
categories of speech refers to the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that some varieties of speech fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection. See Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does
not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
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Billups and similar cases are also problematic because they involve the
regulation of professional speech, at least to the extent that requiring a person
to take an examination and to obtain a government-issued license makes one a
professional. After NIFLA, as Professor Haupt explains, “[w]hether the requirement of content neutrality applies in the area of professional licensing or
professional speech regulation is an unresolved question of First Amendment
doctrine.”252 The NIFLA majority suggested that imposing a license scheme on
people to engage in a profession is problematic because it vests the government
with vast power to quash the First Amendment speech rights of that profession’s members.253
Viewed in light of this tumultuous state of First Amendment affairs regarding both licensing schemes and professional speech, the Fourth Circuit’s decision to engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance in Billups undoubtedly
serves an interest in judicial economy and efficiency.254 Without clear guidance
from the U.S. Supreme Court in licensing cases regarding the level of scrutiny,
and with the future of the professional speech doctrine left dangling tenuously
by the Supreme Court’s own use of scrutiny-determination avoidance in NIFLA, the Fourth Circuit was wise to simply assume that intermediate scrutiny
applied if the three-judge panel knew the ordinance would not pass that test.
Moving to a macro level, Billups ultimately illustrates the need for the Supreme
Court to hear a First Amendment challenge to a licensing scheme and, in turn,
to provide clear guidance to lower courts regarding the relevant level of scrutiny in such cases.
B. Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter255
As addressed in the Introduction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Harbourside Place deployed scrutiny-determination avoidance
when facing a First Amendment challenge to a local ordinance that required
pornography produced with real children.”); see also Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 967–68 (2016) (“The unprotected classes of
speech are often identified as incitement to illegal activity, fighting words, obscenity, defamation, fraud, and speech integral to criminal conduct, although the exact contours of this
list vary among incantations and have changed over time.”).
252 Haupt, supra note 241, at 527–28.
253 As Justice Thomas wrote for the majority:
All that is required to make something a “profession,” according to these courts, is that it involves personalized services and requires a professional license from the State. But that gives the
States unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment rights by simply imposing a licensing requirement. States cannot choose the protection that speech receives under the First
Amendment, as that would give them a powerful tool to impose “invidious discrimination of disfavored subjects.”

Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423–24, n.19 (1993)).
254 See supra Section I.B (addressing the use of scrutiny-determination avoidance in the interest of judicial economy.)
255 Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter, 958 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2020).
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non-residential establishments hosting outside live musical performances either
to comply with certain sound-amplification requirements imposed on locations
classified as outdoor venues or to obtain a special permit from the Town of Jupiter.256 The Eleventh Circuit dubbed the task of sorting out whether this ordinance was content-based or content-neutral—the key determinate for scrutiny
selection—“a very tricky matter.”257 In passing on making this determination,258 the appellate court cited the posture of the proceedings (the preliminary
injunction stage), the interest of judicial minimalism, an undeveloped factual
record, and the parties’ failure to brief and address the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal Communication Commission259 on scrutiny selection.260 The Eleventh Circuit held only
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant a preliminary injunction stopping the ordinance’s enforcement.261
A closer examination of the Eleventh Circuit’s scrutiny-determination
avoidance rationale reveals two important and related tasks regarding scrutiny
selection that the Supreme Court must soon take up. Those chores are:
(1) embracing a more nuanced approach to scrutiny selection that not only
accounts for, but also clearly explicates and delineates among, a trio of critical
concepts: (a) message content, (b) medium of expression, and (c) mode of expression, and
(2) clarifying the meaning, in contexts other than sign-ordinance disputes,
of its statement in Reed v. Town of Gilbert262 that a statute may be facially content-based by “defining regulated speech by its function or purpose.”263
Turning to how Harbourside Place illustrates the significance of the first
of these two tasks, the Eleventh Circuit deployed Reed’s 2015 definition of
when a law is content-based—namely, when it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”264 Citing
McCullen v. Coakley,265 which was addressed earlier266 and was decided one
year before Reed, the Eleventh Circuit opined that the test for determining if a
statute is content-based is whether the governmental authorities who enforce it
256

Id. at 1317; see supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text (addressing scrutinydetermination avoidance in Harbourside Place).
257 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1318.
258 See id. at 1322 (“We . . . do not definitively decide whether [the statute] is on its face a
content-based or content-neutral regulation of speech.”).
259 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
260 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1322.
261 See id. (“We hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying injunctive relief due to Harbourside’s failure to show a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits.”).
262 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
263 Id. at 163.
264 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 163) (emphasis added).
265 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014).
266 Supra Section I.D.
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must review the content of a message being communicated in order to know if
the statute was violated.267 This is a “need-to-read” test.268 Under this messagecentric approach to resolving the content-neutrality issue, the Eleventh Circuit
suggested the ordinance was more likely content-neutral because it applied evenhandedly to all live musical performances, regardless of the specific messages conveyed by the music or the genres of the music.269
The Eleventh Circuit, however, focused on more than simply message content when ferreting out whether the ordinance was content-neutral. It also concentrated on the concept of medium. As the court explained, the statute “applies
to one medium, and one medium only—that of live musical performances—
while allowing other live events that produce sound (e.g., a political speech, a
religious sermon, an educational presentation, an aerobics class, or a poetry
reading).”270 This language suggests the ordinance is content-based because
live musical performances are restricted while live political speeches and other
live speech-based events are left unscathed.
The problem here, however, is that the Eleventh Circuit’s quotation immediately above conflates message content—political, religious, and educational
content—with not only the medium of expression, but also with the mode of
expression. Specifically, the medium of expression, in this Article’s view, is
better defined as the physical means through which message content is conveyed. For instance, sound amplification devices are a medium through which
content might be conveyed to an audience. Similarly, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, signs were the physical medium through which the regulated messages
were communicated.271
Music, on the other hand, is not a physical medium of expression. It is, this
Article avers, better understood as a mode of expression. Mode of expression,
in this light, is the manner in which message content is conveyed—it is how a
message, irrespective of the physical medium through which it is communicated and regardless of the substantive idea in the content, is expressed. The Supreme Court, in fact, recently wrestled with this conception of mode of expression in Iancu v. Brunetti.272 In considering the constitutionality of a federal
statute permitting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to block the registration of scandalous marks, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[s]tanding alone,
267

Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1318 (citing McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479). The Supreme
Court in McCullen explained that the law at issue there “would be content based if it required ‘enforcement authorities’ to ‘examine the content of the message that is conveyed to
determine whether’ a violation has occurred.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 479 (quoting FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984)).
268 Trevarthen & Hapner, supra note 6, at 521–27.
269 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1318.
270 Id.
271 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 159 (2015) (“The town of Gilbert, Arizona . . . has adopted a comprehensive code governing the manner in which people may display outdoor signs.”).
272 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2298 (2019).
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the term ‘scandalous’ need not be understood to reach marks that offend because of the ideas they convey; it can be read more narrowly to bar only marks
that offend because of their mode of expression—marks that are obscene, vulgar, or profane.”273 Furthermore, the fighting words doctrine prohibits speech
because of the mode of expressing an idea, not because of the idea itself.274
Consider an example that illustrates the sometimes-slippery distinctions
here among message content, medium of expression, and mode of expression.
Start with a printed statement that reads: “The pandemic is terrible. It must be
stopped. Wear a mask. That’s a task.” That statement is the message content. If
the message content is then sung in a melodic way or is accompanied by instrumentation such as drums and piano, then the mode of expressing the content of the message is musical. Furthermore, if the musical mode of expressing
the message content to the public occurs through the use of sound amplification
equipment, then that equipment represents the physical medium of expression.
Alternatively, if the message content were to be printed on paper and distributed to people, then the medium of expression would be paper.
In summary, Harbourside Place illustrates the need for the Supreme Court
to better elucidate the differences between three core concepts—message, medium, and mode—as they affect the scrutiny selection process and the weight
each should be accorded in that decision. Improved semantic hygiene must be
embraced by the high court to help guide lower ones that confront ordinances
such as that in Harbourside Place in which message content, medium of expression, and mode of expression are triangulated. Without such clarity, engagement in scrutiny-determination avoidance such as that used by the Eleventh Circuit seems likely to continue.
The second task the Supreme Court should take on, in light of the appellate
court’s analysis of the scrutiny issue in Harbourside Place, is to flesh out the
meaning of its assertion in Reed that a “more subtle” way that a law might be
deemed facially content-based—a way less obvious, that is, than by checking to
see if a law “defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter”—is to determine if it “defin[es] regulated speech by its function or purpose.”275 In the
context of sign-based cases, the meaning of “function or purpose” appears
clear, such as measures that only regulate signs that function to convey direc-

273

Id. at 2303 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added). See
also Clay Calvert, Iancu v. Brunetti's Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity, 43 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 37, 55–63 (2019) (addressing the mode-of-expression by the various Justices in Brunetti).
274 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (“[T]he reason why fighting
words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their
content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to
convey.”).
275 Reed, 576 U.S. at 163.
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tions or signs that function to convey residential addresses.276 But what does
this language mean outside of this context?
The Eleventh Circuit in Harbourside Place quoted Reed’s function-orpurpose language regarding this more subtle way of classifying a law as facially content-based.277 In doing so, the appellate court seemingly was concerned
that regulating live musical performances—the ones to which the ordinance applied—might function to impact musical content in ways different from regulating recorded music.278 This fret about the law, by its terms, treating live music differently than recorded music relates back to the discussion of the medium
of expression noted above.279 In brief, the Eleventh Circuit appeared bothered
that a live medium of expression was being handled differently than a taped or
electronically recorded medium of expression and that this distinction unfairly
impacted and discriminated against content conveyed by live performers.280
Perhaps, then, live music serves a different function or purpose—for the establishments that play it, for the performers who engage in it, and for the audiences that listen to it—than recorded music.
Is this what the Supreme Court in Reed meant by a more subtle way in
which a law might be deemed facially content-based by defining regulated
speech based on its function or purpose? Alternatively, could Reed’s functionor-purpose language mean that the law in Harbourside Place is content-based
because music—as a regulated mode of expressing content and regardless of
whether it is conveyed through a live or recorded medium—serves a different
function and purpose for listeners than does, to use the Eleventh Circuit’s example, the unregulated mode of poetry?281 In other words, does the determination of facial content-neutrality partly hinge on the Town of Jupiter’s regulatory
distinction between live and recorded music, or does it turn on the distinction
between music as a regulated mode of expression and other non-regulated
modes of expression that may serve purposes different from listening to music,
be it live or recorded?
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit in Harbourside Place threw up its hands
on such questions, which blur the lines separating content from medium from
mode. It remarked that Reed’s function-or-purpose language was merely “dic-
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See Reagan Nat’l Adver. of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d 696, 706 (5th Cir.
2020) (“Reed reasoned that a distinction can be facially content based if it defines regulated
speech by its function or purpose. Here, the Sign Code defines ‘off-premises’ signs by their
purpose: advertising or directing attention to a business, product, activity, institution, etc.,
not located at the same location as the sign.”).
277 Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter, 958 F.3d 1308, 1319 (11th Cir. 2020).
278 See id. (“As Harbourside points out, ‘[l]ive musical performance, as opposed to commercially available recorded music, may . . . contain improvisation of musical notes, lyrics, and
vocalization, as well as physical and vocal expression.’ ” (citation omitted)).
279 See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text (addressing the medium of expression).
280 Harbourside Place, 958 F.3d at 1319.
281 See id. at 1318.

22 NEV. L.J. 1

42

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

ta . . . because the Supreme Court did not apply it” there.282 This anticlimactic
conclusion illustrates the need for the Court either to jettison this dicta in contexts other than sign-ordinance cases or to fully flesh out what is meant by this
facet of the test for determining when a law is facially content-based and thus
must surmount strict scrutiny to be constitutional.283 More bluntly put, this
“more subtle”284 method of detecting a facially content-based law must be
made less subtle in its meaning and application for it to prove truly useful in
lower courts’ analyses of scrutiny selection. Reed’s dicta may be too subtle for
its own good.
In summary, the Eleventh Circuit’s engagement in scrutiny-determination
avoidance in Harbourside Place suggests (1) definitional problems in scrutiny
selection regarding the difference in meaning among message content, medium
of expression, and mode of expression; (2) applicational issues for the roles that
both medium of expression and mode of expression play in scrutiny selection
after Reed when they interact with message content; and (3) doctrinal problems
regarding Reed’s function-or-purpose test for resolving questions of facial content-neutrality.
C. McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City285
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in McCraw illustrates a reason for engaging in scrutiny-determination avoidance not yet addressed in this Article: to avoid getting bogged down in the mire that may well
be the cloudy legislative history behind a facially content-neutral statute and
trying to decipher if the legislative intent was, in fact, nefarious.286 Per the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert,287 a statute that is contentneutral on its face will nonetheless be deemed content-based and thus must face
strict scrutiny if the government’s purpose in adopting it was to discriminate

282

Id. at 1319.
Indeed, laws deemed facially content-based under this “function or purpose” test must
also face strict scrutiny. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015) (“Some
facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular
subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore,
are subject to strict scrutiny.” (emphasis added)).
284 Id. at 163.
285 McCraw v. City of Okla. City, 973 F.3d 1057, 1057 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 1738 (2021).
286 See Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an
Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 72 (1997) (noting “the subjective, speculative endeavors by individual justices into the often murky realm of legislative
intent” when ferreting out scrutiny in First Amendment cases (emphasis omitted)). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 621–88 (1990)
(providing an excellent review of the relationship among text, legislative history, and legislative intent when attempting to give meaning to statutes).
287 Reed, 576 U.S. 155.
283
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against a particular type of expression.288 In brief, Reed created a two-step test
for resolving the content-neutrality issue, with the first step focusing on whether a law, by its terms, is facially content-neutral and the second step then addressing whether a facially content-neutral law was adopted for an illicit objective that would transform it into a content-based one.289 The first step, in other
words, privileges a textualist approach to scrutiny—is the law content-neutral
based on its terms?—while the second delves into legislative intent and purpose.
In McCraw, the Tenth Circuit deemed it unnecessary to decide if an Oklahoma City ordinance that banned sitting and standing on medians in public
roadways was content-based because the ordinance would fail the less rigorous
intermediate scrutiny test that applies to content-neutral laws, meaning it would
necessarily fail the more stringent strict scrutiny standard.290 The version of the
ordinance considered by the Tenth Circuit and adopted in 2017 banned people
from “stand[ing], sit[ting], or stay[ing] for any purpose on any portion of a median located within a street or highway open for use by vehicular traffic if the
posted speed limit for such street or highway is 40 mph or greater.”291 It also
included a legislative intent section providing that it was “not intended to impermissibly limit an individual’s right to exercise free speech.”292 Instead, its
stated purpose was “to protect pedestrians and drivers alike by imposing a specific place and manner restrictions for certain places where substantial threats
of grievous bodily injury or death exist due to vehicular traffic traveling at high
speeds.”293
The Tenth Circuit, however, noted that the author of the original version of
the ordinance, which was adopted in 2015, “cited complaints she had received
from citizens and businesses regarding panhandling and repeatedly described

288

See id. at 164 (holding that “facially content neutral” laws “will be considered contentbased regulations of speech” if they “were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
289 See Armijo, supra note 71, at 67 (describing Reed’s two-step approach to resolving the
content-neutrality issue and noting that the second step “appl[ies] to facially content-neutral
laws; a reviewing court can also subject those laws to strict scrutiny if the government
adopted the law under review because of disagreement with the message expressed by the
speech the law infringes upon”).
290 The appellate court explained in McCraw that
[p]laintiffs argue that we should apply strict scrutiny because the Revised Ordinance discriminates based on content. We need not reach this argument. As discussed below, we ultimately
conclude the Revised Ordinance fails even intermediate scrutiny. Because it would necessarily
also fail strict scrutiny, we assume for the purposes of our analysis that the Revised Ordinance is
content-neutral.

McCraw, 973 F.3d at 1070.
291 OKLA. CITY, OKLA., CODE § 32-458 (d) (2019).
292 Id. § 32-458 (b).
293 Id.
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the Original Ordinance as addressing panhandling.”294 Additionally, “city officials and others pointed to panhandlers as the impetus for the Original Ordinance.”295 This suggests the true motivation underlying the ordinance was to
discriminate against a particular form of speech—solicitations for money—
rather than to safeguard pedestrians and drivers from injury or death. Further
problematic for Oklahoma City was that it could not muster any evidence of
pedestrians having been struck on medians in that metropolis during an extended period of time.296 In brief, while the revised version of the law did not target
panhandlers by its terms, the history beneath it suggested a discriminatory motive aiming at the First Amendment-protected form of speech that is soliciting
charitable contributions.297
Rather than wade into this quagmire of legislative purpose and intent, the
Tenth Circuit’s engagement in scrutiny-determination avoidance afforded an
efficient means of resolving the case. Specifically, it saved the court substantial
time and effort in having to sort out whether the measure, although seemingly
content-neutral on its face, was adopted for the illicit purpose of discriminating
against the speech of panhandlers and thus needed to face strict scrutiny.298 As
the Tenth Circuit explained in McCraw:
Our independent examination of the record reveals troubling evidence of animus
against panhandlers in the passage of the Original and Revised Ordinances. But
because we conclude that the City’s Revised Ordinance fails even intermediate
scrutiny, we are not required to delve into whether its ostensible contentneutrality is instead camouflage for the City’s desire to sacrifice speech in order
to ban unpopular panhandling.299

In brief, assuming that a law is content-neutral and letting it fail under intermediate scrutiny eliminates, in time-saving fashion, the need to wrestle with
294
295
296

McCraw, 973 F.3d at 1062.
Id.
Id. at 1064. The appellate court noted:
In response to a request from plaintiffs for all accident reports involving medians or pedestrians,
the City produced 504 reports dating from 2012 to 2017. No report involved a pedestrian struck
on any median. Out of 39,833 accidents reported from 2010 to 2015, none involved pedestrians
on medians. Further, at trial, the City could not identify anyone injured on a median in Oklahoma City or any accident caused by pedestrian activity on a median.

Id.
297

See, e.g., Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[A]sking for charity or
gifts, whether ‘on the street or door to door,’ is protected First Amendment speech.” (quoting
Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980))); Vigue v.
Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (“Soliciting charity is constitutionally
protected expression.”); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 232 (D. Mass.
2015) (“Soliciting contributions is expressive activity that is protected by the First Amendment.”).
298 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 164 (2015) (holding that “facially content
neutral” laws “will be considered content-based regulations of speech” if they “were adopted
by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
299 McCraw, 973 F.3d at 1070, n.8.
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legislative intent under the second step of Reed’s test for content-neutrality.
McCraw thus constitutes an example of judicial minimalism in service of judicial economy.
With this analysis in mind of scrutiny-determination avoidance in three
2020 federal appellate court rulings, each illustrating different problems with a
scrutiny selection process that largely pivots on categorizing a law as contentbased or content-neutral, the Conclusion provides some overarching observations about scrutiny-determination avoidance. It also suggests that McCullen’s
rigorous approach to the narrow-tailoring prong of intermediate scrutiny makes
it easier to evade definitive scrutiny selection, as the gulf between strict and intermediate scrutiny narrows in their practical applications.300
CONCLUSION
This Article explored more than a half-dozen reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court might engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance in cases involving the First Amendment right of free speech. Rationales for doing so, which
may overlap in any particular case, include
• embracing a minimalistic judicial philosophy,301
• attempting to bring more Justices together in a single opinion,302
• promoting judicial economy,303
• evading strict scrutiny as binding precedent in all future cases involving a
particular medium or variety of expression,304
• keeping the peace among the Justices and avoiding public perceptions of
ideological bias that might erode the Court’s legitimacy when addressing politically and morally contentious and polarizing issues,305
• dodging the need to overrule precedent and violate the principle of stare
decisis,306 and
• preserving the opportunity for the development of a new or emerging
First Amendment doctrine subject to something less demanding than strict scrutiny.307
In the process of examining these reasons, Part I offered possible explanations for the decision to embrace this methodology in Packingham v. North
Carolina, City of Ladue v. Gilleo, and National Institute of Family and Life Ad-

300

See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (addressing McCullen’s analysis of narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny).
301 Supra Section I.A.
302 Supra Section I.A.
303 Supra Section I.B.
304 Supra Section I.C.
305 Supra Section I.D.
306 Supra Section I.D.
307 Supra Section I.E.
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vocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra.308 Additionally, Part I analyzed Justice Scalia’s
rather withering criticism of the Court’s decision in McCullen v. Coakley not to
engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance when the hot-button topic of abortion underpinned the case.309 Furthermore, Part I addressed Justice O’Connor’s
discussion in Gilleo of the doctrinal problems that are pushed to the backburner
when the Court punts on scrutiny selection.310 In other words, passing on hard
questions regarding standards of scrutiny thwarts doctrinal development. It just
kicks the can of doctrinal worms down the judicial road. Confronting difficult
questions, instead, may add much needed nuance to the scrutiny selection process that a rigid and reductionist categorical approach—one that pigeonholes
laws into the categories of content-based and content-neutral—lacks.311
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City adds another incentive for engaging in scrutiny-determination avoidance by assuming
that intermediate scrutiny applies.312 Namely, it allows courts to steer clear of
having to ferret out the precise legislative intent behind a facially contentneutral law, thereby allowing courts to dodge the second and possibly timeconsuming step of Reed’s analysis.313
A final point regarding scrutiny-determination avoidance merits both consideration and concern. It is this: the more rigorous the Supreme Court makes
the narrow-tailoring prong of intermediate scrutiny as it did in McCullen, the
less of a difference there is between that standard of review and strict scrutiny.314 Furthermore, the Court added teeth to this facet of intermediate scrutiny
in NIFLA, with one article noting that the NIFLA majority’s application of intermediate scrutiny “looks more like the narrow tailoring requirement of strict
scrutiny.”315 That is because, under the NIFLA majority’s tack, a governmentsponsored advertising or public information campaign would always seem to
provide a less restrictive alternative method of serving the governmental interest in educating the public, when compared to mandating a private entity to
308

See supra Sections I.B, I.C, I.E (addressing, respectively, Packingham, Gilleo, and NIFLA).
309 See supra Section I.D.
310 See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (addressing Justice O’Connor’s concerns
in Gilleo).
311 Cf. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2305 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (lamenting the Court’s process of “deducing the answers to First Amendment
[scrutiny] questions strictly from categories,” and addressing “the limits of relying on rigid
First Amendment categories”).
312 See supra Section II.C (addressing McCraw).
313 Cf. Lakier, supra note 13, at 235 (“The [Reed] Court thus construed the test of content
neutrality as a two-step inquiry in which courts first determine whether a law makes facial
content distinctions, and second, if—but only if—it doesn’t, do they look at the purposes that
justify the law.”).
314 See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (addressing McCullen’s analysis of narrow tailoring under intermediate scrutiny).
315 Recent Case, National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 347, 354 (2018).
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convey the government’s message.316 The space separating strict scrutiny’s
demand that the means of serving an interest be the least speech-restrictive
method possible317 and intermediate scrutiny’s requirement that there be “a
close fit”318 between the means and the ends such that the means do not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary319 is closing.
The big-picture implication of the collapsing gap between intermediate and
strict scrutiny on their respective narrow-tailoring elements is that it makes it
easier for courts to assume, for the sake of argument, that a law is subject to intermediate scrutiny and to apply that test to strike it down. In other words, it is
less problematic to engage in scrutiny-determination avoidance because intermediate scrutiny becomes a more difficult standard for a law to pass than it was
in the past. The more rigorous intermediate scrutiny becomes, the more likely a
statute is to be declared unconstitutional when a court defaults to—rather than
definitively adopts—intermediate scrutiny via scrutiny-determination avoidance.
In fact, in looking back at the First Amendment cases analyzed in this Article in which the Supreme Court engaged in scrutiny-determination avoidance
and assumed that intermediate scrutiny applied, the laws in question all failed
under the narrow-tailoring prong, not the government-interest prong. To wit,
the majority in 2018 in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra320 assumed that California possessed the requisite substantial
interest necessary to survive intermediate scrutiny—namely, “providing lowincome women with information about state-sponsored services.”321 The law
compelling licensed crisis pregnancy centers to communicate such information
to their patients, however, failed the tailoring prong because the measure was
underinclusive and because there were less restrictive alternative means of
serving California’s interest.322
Similarly, the Court in 2017 in Packingham v. North Carolina323 assumed
that the Tar Heel State had a significant interest in protecting minors from sex-

316

See id. at 354–55 (contending that the NIFLA majority’s “rationale would undercut any
asserted government interest in regulating through compelled speech—no disclosure requirements can survive even intermediate scrutiny if the government always has the option
to create an advertising campaign rather than mandate disclosure”).
317 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (“If either of these arguments is correct, then the Act must satisfy strict scrutiny—that is, it must be the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling state interest.”).
318 Id. at 485.
319 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
320 Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. (NIFLA) v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
321 Id. at 2375.
322 Id. at 2375–76.
323 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).

22 NEV. L.J. 1

48

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:1

ual abuse.324 The problem, however, was that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest because it was “unprecedented in the scope of First
Amendment speech it burden[ed].”325 By “foreclose[ing] access to social media
altogether,”326 the law was simply too “sweeping”327 to serve North Carolina’s
interest.
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,328 another case in which the Court assumed, for
the sake of argument, that a statute was content-neutral and thus only needed to
pass intermediate scrutiny,329 the sign ordinance was not sufficiently tailored
because it banned “almost all residential signs.”330 The Court explained that
“[a]lthough prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of
content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of
speech is readily apparent—by eliminating a common means of speaking, such
measures can suppress too much speech.”331 The remedy for Ladue thus was to
go back to the legislative drafting board and to adopt “more temperate
measures”332 in serving its interests in aesthetics, property values, and safety.333
In sum, if the Court already uses intermediate scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring
prong to strike down laws when it engages in scrutiny-determination avoidance
and if, in turn, that prong is becoming more demanding in its nature in light of
McCullen and NIFLA, then this added rigor incentivizes the expanded use of
scrutiny-determination avoidance because the difference between the strict and
intermediate scrutiny standards in their practical application is diminished. Put
differently, the odds of a statute being struck down under intermediate scrutiny
are enhanced because of this more stringent tailoring requirement, thereby
making it easier for the Court to pass on applying strict scrutiny when declaring
a law unconstitutional. To some extent, then, assuming intermediate scrutiny
applies becomes more of a symbolic move rather than one making a practical,
as-applied doctrinal difference when compared to strict scrutiny.
Ultimately, while scrutiny-determination avoidance may be invoked for
any one of the multiple reasons articulated in this Article,334 its deployment
hinders doctrinal development. Justice O’Connor’s words more than a quarter324

See id. at 1736 (“And it is clear that a legislature ‘may pass valid laws to protect children’ and other victims of sexual assault ‘from abuse.’ ” (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002))).
325 Id. at 1737.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
329 See id. at 53 (“In examining the propriety of Ladue’s near total prohibition of residential
signs, we will assume, arguendo, the validity of the City’s submission that the various exemptions are free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination.”).
330 Id. at 58.
331 Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
332 Id. at 58.
333 See id. at 47 (identifying the interests and concerns underlying Ladue’s ordinance).
334 Supra notes 301–07, 313.
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century ago in Gilleo about the virtues of directly tackling the scrutiny selection
question in difficult cases and thereby allowing the Court’s “rules [to] evolve
and improve”335 through reexamination thus should not be forgotten the next
time the Court considers punting on scrutiny. The line separating laudable judicial minimalism from condemnable doctrinal evasion is a very fine one.

335

Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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